The effects of gender and length of time between commission of crime and trial on juveniles' trial outcomes by Larson, Kimberly A.
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Gender and Length of Time Between Commission of Crime and Trial 
on Juveniles' Trial Outcomes  
  
A Dissertation  
Submitted to the Faculty  
of  
Drexel University  
by  
Kimberly A. Larson  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree  
of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
September 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
A special thanks to my committee Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein, Kirk Heilbrun, Bret Boyer, 
David Rubenstein, and Elliot Atkins for all of your help, not only with my dissertation, 
but throughout my graduate school career.  Thank you to Amanda for your help in 
facilitating this project while I was on internship.  And, of course, my sincerest 
appreciation and thanks to my mother, my father, my sister, Erica and my best friends 
Brad, Danielle, Tara, Sean, Katy, Jess and Kate for your understanding, support, and 
caring throughout this process.  Without all of you, none of this would have been 
possible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
LIST OF TABLES….…….……………….………………………………………..vi 
LIST OF FIGURES…………...…….……………………………………………..vii 
ABSTRACT……….………………………….…………………………..……….viii 
1. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY……………………..…….1 
1.1 Influences Outside of Our Awareness.………………................................1 
1.1.1 Stereotypes Influence Our Awareness.…..……………………….....1 
1.1.2 Age as an Extralegal Factor Effecting Punishment.……………..….2 
 
1.1.3 Gender as an Extralegal Factor Effecting Punishment…………...…8 
 
2. RATIONALE…………………………….………………………………….27 
2.1 Age……...…..………………………………..……………………..…...29 
2.2 Gender………………….…...…………………...…………….……..….31 
3. HYPOTHESES…………....…………………………………………………35 
 3.1 Main Effects…………..…………………………..…………………..….35 
3.2 Interactions………………..………………..…………………………….37 
  4. METHOD…………………..…………………………………………………38 
 4.1 Participants………………………………………..…………………..….38 
 4.2 Design…………………….………………..………………………….….38 
     4.3 Materials………………………………………………………………….39 
4.4 Procedure………………………………………………………………….40 
 4.5 Method of Analysis……………………………………...………………...41 
5. RESULTS……………………………………………………………………43 
 5.1 Preliminary Analyses……………..……………………………………...43 
  
 
 iv
 5.2 Demographic Data……….…………………………………………..……44 
5.3 The Effect of Defendants’ Age and Gender on Judges’ Ratings of 
Defendants’  Likelihood of Recidivism, Dangerousness, Responsibility, and 
Appropriate Sentence Length………………..………………………………..44 
 
5.4 Prediction of Judges’ Verdicts Based Upon Defendant’s Age and 
Gender………………………………………………………………………...46 
 
5.5 Effect of Judge Demographic Characteristics on Judges’ Ratings of 
Sentence Length, Responsibility, Likelihood of Recidivism, and 
Dangerousness……………………………………………………………...…47 
 
6. DISCUSSION…….………………………………...…………………………..48 
6.1 Gender…………………...……………………….………………………….48 
 6.2 Age…………..….……..……………………………….………………..…..51 
6.3.Interaction Between Gender and Age……..…….….……………….…..…..52 
  6.4 The Effect of Judge Demographic Characteristics on Juvenile Trial     
Outcomes………………………………………………………………………..53 
 
7. LIMITATIONS…………………………………………………………………..54 
8. IMPLICATIONS………………………...………………………………………57 
 
8.1 Implications for Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial of Biases in Trial  
Outcomes................................................................................................................59 
 
9. FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH………………………………………………63 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES.…………………………………………………………..……65 
APPENDIX A: TABLES………………………………………………………….…..…73 
APPENDIX B: FIGURES……………………...………………………………………..82 
APPENDIX C:  Letter Introducing Study, Consent, Instructions…………………….…86 
APPENDIX D:  Follow-up Letter Introducing Study, Consent, Instructions……………87 
APPENDIX E:  Trial Vignette……………………………………………………...……88 
APPENDIX F:  Brief Questionnaire Regarding Trial Vignette.........................................90 
  
 
 v
APPENDIX G:  Demographic Survey………………………………………………….92 
VITA……………………………………………………………………………………95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 vi
List of Tables 
1. Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Appropriate Sentence Length for Juvenile 
Defendant by Judges’ Demographic Characteristics …………………………..71 
2. Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Juvenile Defendants’ Responsibility by Judges’ 
Demographic Characteristics …………………………………………….……..72 
3. Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Juvenile Defendants’ Dangerousness by Judges’ 
Demographic Characteristics ……………………………………………………73 
4. Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Juvenile Defendants’ Likelihood of Recidivism 
by Judges’ Demographic Characteristics ………………………………………..74 
5. Correlations Between Dependent Variables...................................................…...75 
6. Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ 
Rating of Sentence Length……………………………………………………….75 
7. Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ 
Ratings of 
Responsibility…………………………………………………………………….76 
8. Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ 
Ratings of Dangerousness…...…………………………………………………...77 
9. Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ 
Ratings of Likelihood of Recidivism…………….………………………….…...78 
10. Planned Contrasts Between Age Groups and Dangerousness and Recidivism....79 
 
 
 
  
 
 vii
List of Figures 
 
1. Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Responsibility………………...………80 
2. Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Dangerousness………………………..81 
3. Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Sentence Length….…………….…….82 
4. Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Likelihood of Recidivism…………….83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 viii
Abstract 
The Effects of Gender and Length of Time Between Commission of Crime and Trial on 
Juveniles' Trial Outcomes  
Kimberly Larson, M.S., J.D.   
Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein, Ph.D. 
Similar to adults, juveniles’ trials are often delayed for a variety of reasons; 
however, developmental changes associated with adolescence and early adulthood 
differentiate them from adults in many ways. This study investigated the ways in which 
the length of time from crime to trial may affect juveniles’ trial outcomes. Further, it 
investigated the ways that extralegal factors, such as age and gender, change judges’ 
perceptions of defendants’ guilt and culpability. In particular, it examined the effect of 
these extralegal factors on judges’ perceptions of the appropriate verdict and sentence 
length, as well as perceptions of defendants’ levels of responsibility for the crime, 
likelihood of recidivism, and dangerousness.  The study examined these questions using a 
hypothetical case vignette that varied a defendant’s gender and age at the time of trial, 
while keeping the age at the time of the crime constant.   
Participants included 295 juvenile and criminal court judges who, after reading 
the vignette, completed a short questionnaire asking them what they believed would be 
the appropriate verdict and sentence length, as well as their perceptions of the defendants’ 
levels of responsibility, likelihood of recidivism, and dangerousness. Following the 
survey, participants were asked to complete a short demographics questionnaire.  
  
 
 ix
 Results revealed a main effect for defendant’s age on judges’ ratings of likelihood 
of recidivism and dangerousness.  Specifically, judges rated younger defendants as more 
likely to recidivate and more dangerous than older juveniles.  There was no main effect 
for defendant’s gender and no interaction between gender and age were found.   
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CHAPTER 1:  BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
Influences Outside of Our Awareness  
Stereotypes Influence Our Awareness  
 
Individuals are influenced by factors outside of their awareness (Graham & 
Lowry, 2004). Social psychology has explored the influence of stereotypes or “culturally 
shared beliefs” that are “both positive and negative” “about the characteristics and 
behavior of certain groups” on both our conscious and unconscious decision-making 
processes (Graham & Lowry, p. 484). For example, our culture generally holds the 
beliefs that “blondes have more fun” and that “Asians are studious” (Graham & Lowry, 
p. 484).  
Stereotypes have been found to influence and guide our conscious processes, even 
when we are completely unaware of them (Graham & Lowry, 2004). Researchers believe 
that because we are often forced to perceive, digest, and act upon large amounts of 
information very quickly, we develop stereotypes or heuristics as a shorthand for judging 
individuals (Gideon & Teigen, 2004). Specifically, we evaluate the extent to which an 
individual fits the stereotyped group and treat him or her accordingly (Gideon & Tiegen).  
This human tendency to judge individuals by perceived group characteristics is in 
direct conflict with our legal system. In the American legal system, justice is supposed to 
be blind (U.S. Constitutional Amendment XIV). According to the 14th Amendment’s 
mandate of a fair trial, defendants are to be convicted on the basis of evidence, with 
legally irrelevant considerations excluded (U.S. Constitutional Amendment XVI). 
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However, research shows us that, in fact, trials may be influenced by factors that should 
be considered irrelevant in determining the defendant’s guilt (Wrightsman, Nietzel, & 
Fortune, 1998). In fact, these stereotypic “extralegal factors” have been shown to affect 
the decisions of judges, resulting in disparities in trial outcome based, not on the evidence 
and culpability of the defendant, but on less substantive factors, such as generalizations 
based upon immutable characteristics of the defendant or victim (De La Fuente, De La 
Fuente, & Garcia, 2003; Hahn & Clayton, 1996; Jones & Kaplan, 2003; Warling, 2001; 
Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003). For example, some research has demonstrated that 
because mock jurors associated certain races with particular crimes, they are likely to 
give more negative verdicts and attributions when the defendant’s crime and race are 
congruent with these stereotypes (Jones & Kaplan). In fact, effects such as these have 
been demonstrated across a variety of areas, such as SES, ethnicity, religion, gender 
(Hahn & Clayton) attractiveness (De La Fuente; De La Fuente, & Garcia) and age 
(Warling; Warling & Peterson-Badali). 
 
Age as an Extralegal Factor Effecting Punishment  
 
Everyday Examples that Support the Idea that Individuals Stereotype on the Basis of Age  
 
Both the literature and our common experiences demonstrate that age is a variable 
that can affect our perceptions. One need only look to our own laws to see that, in our 
common experience, age changes our views of individuals, and we often stereotype 
individuals on the basis of these perceptions. If this were not true, age discrimination 
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laws, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), would be 
unnecessary (ADEA, 1990). However, it is not only the elderly in our society that are 
judged by group characteristics rather than on an individual basis. In fact, a variety of 
laws have been enacted that reflect our collective societal view that younger individuals 
are different from adults. For example, juveniles are not granted the same rights and 
privileges as adults, such as driving, drinking (National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 
1984), or voting (U.S. Constitutional Amendment XXVI, 1971) because society deems 
them less developed than adults and, therefore, unable to handle the responsibilities 
associated with such privileges (Campbell, 1992). In fact, the younger the juvenile, the 
less freedom he or she is likely to be granted due to society’s perceptions of youth (e.g., 
driving).  
 
Evidence from History and Case Law Supporting the Idea that Age Effects Juveniles’ 
Adjudication within the United States Justice System  
 
Traditionally, juveniles have been purposefully treated differently with respect to 
their adjudication in the justice system. For example, common law differentiated 
juveniles according to a three-tiered system (Dressler, 1999; Mack, 1909; Stapleton & 
Teitelbaum, 1972). Children below age seven were considered incapable of forming the 
criminal intent required to commit a crime, and children above age fourteen, were treated 
as fully responsible adults (Dressler, 1999; Richey Mann, 1984). Between the ages of 
seven and fourteen, a rebuttable presumption existed that the child was able to form the 
intent to commit a crime (Dressler; Richey Mann; Mack; Stapleton & Teitelbaum).  
In the late 1800s, due to our beliefs that younger juveniles were less culpable than 
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older offenders, the United States created a separate juvenile justice system for trying 
youthful offenses (Besharov, 1974). Further, even during the past 25 years with the shift 
in our legal system toward harsher punishment, many scholars and policy makers still 
believe that younger offenders are less culpable (e.g., Bandali, 1999). Recent decisions, 
such as Roper v. Simmons (2005), which excluded those under 18 years old from 
imposition of the death penalty, demonstrate this societal attitude. In Roper, examining 
the “evolving standards of decency,” the Court found that executing those under the age 
of 18 was cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment (Roper, p. 1190). The 
Court reasoned that, while earlier decisions, such as Stanford (1989), had found that 
executing those under 18 was not cruel and unusual, since that decision, a national 
consensus had developed against the imposition of the death penalty for juveniles 
(Roper). The Court stated that juveniles differed from adults in three ways that should 
exempt them from the death penalty: (1) their “susceptibility to immature and 
irresponsible behavior means their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible 
as that of an adult” (2) “[t]heir own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over 
their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be 
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment” and (3) 
“[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less 
supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of 
irretrievably depraved character” (Roper, p. 1195). In other words, the Court found that 
the general societal consensus was that juveniles are less culpable than adults due to their 
immaturity, lesser ability to escape negative environments, and personality characteristics 
which may not yet be permanent (Roper).  
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From the evidence cited above, it appears that, not only do our perceptions of age 
appear to serve as a mitigator in the justice system with younger juveniles being 
perceived as less culpable, but the younger a juvenile, the greater the benefit of this 
effect. However, one need not rely on general assertions and circumstantial evidence of 
the effects of age on individual’s perceptions’, experimental evidence exists.  
 
Age as an Extralegal Factor: Research on the Effects of Age and Age-related Variables 
on Punishment  
 
Research on the effects of age-related variables on punishment for crimes.  
 
Related, but not synonymous with age, is “babyfacedness,” or the “extent to 
which a person’s facial features resemble that of a prototypical baby” (Zebrowtiz & 
McDonald, 1991, p. 605). In empirical research “babyfacedness” is usually determined 
by measuring the facial features of an individual; “babyfacedness” has been characterized 
as including “larger eyes, thinner, higher eyebrows, a large forehead and a small chin, 
and a curved rather than an angular face” (Zebrowtiz & McDonald, p. 605). This 
combination of facial features has also been found to affect trial outcomes, even when 
legally relevant variables are controlled. Babyfaced people have been found to be 
considered more honest and naïve, two characteristics which might also be associated 
with youth (Berry & McArthur, 1985; McArthur & Aptow, 1984; McArthur & Berry, 
1987; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 1990, 1992). Similar results were obtained using a 
Southern-European sample (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004). In addition, 
babyfacedness was also found to be associated with kindness and warmth (Berry & 
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McArthur). This effect on individuals’ perceptions has occurred regardless of whether the 
face is static or moving (Zebrowitz-McArthur & Montepare, 1989).  
Researchers have also examined the influence of children’s facial maturity on 
parental punishment of their children. Zebrowitz, Kendall-Tackett, & Fafel (1991) 
examined 32 middle class families whose children who were rated on level of 
babyfacedness. When the parents’ punishments of their children were examined, they 
found that more mature-faced children’s actions were perceived as more intentional than 
those of their baby-faced counterparts (Zebrowitz, Kendall-Tackett, & Fafel). Further, 
when intentionality was held constant, babyfacedness was associated with decreased 
punishment severity for younger children and increased punishment severity for older 
children who committed relatively serious infractions, such as hurting another child or 
destroying property (Zebrowitz, Kendall-Tackett, & Fafel).  
This finding paralleled results of an earlier study examining the impact of facial 
maturity on perceptions of legal responsibility (Berry & Zebrowitz-MacArthur, 1988). In 
that study, 128 undergraduates read vignettes containing a pretrial intake report about a 
male defendant that had committed either an intentional or negligent crime and plead 
either guilty or not guilty to that crime (Berry & Zebrowitz-MacArthur). Researchers 
found that more severe punishments were recommended for baby-faced defendants than 
for mature-faced individuals who admitted to committing premeditated crimes (Berry & 
Zebrowitz-MacArthur). Zebrowitz et al. (1991) posited that the outcome was the result of 
a violation of the expectations of the individual meting out the punishments. Participants 
were also more likely to believe that baby-faced defendants committed negligent 
offenses, while mature-faced defendants were perceived as more likely to commit crimes 
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involving dishonest intentional behavior (Berry & Zebrowitz-MacArthur).  
 
Research on the effects of age on punishment.  
 
In addition to examining babyfacedness, research has directly addressed the 
impact of defendants’ ages on trial outcomes. These studies found that although age did 
not affect the verdict in juvenile defendants’ trials, age did predict sentence length, with 
younger juveniles receiving shorter sentences than older juveniles (Warling, 2001; 
Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003). Further, other studies, conducted prior to Roper, 
found that the defendant’s age predicted likelihood of receiving a sentence of execution, 
with hypothetical defendants in the vignette who were older receiving harsher 
punishment (Crosby, Britner, Preston, Jodl, & Portwood, 1995). However, one study did 
not find this age effect, instead obtaining the seemingly inconsistent finding that, despite 
the fact that age did not impact sentence length, participants still viewed younger 
defendants as less accountable (Ghetti & Redlich, 2001).  
Two studies have provided evidence of the effect of defendants’ ages on jurors’ 
sentencing decisions. First, using both a sample of university students and a public 
sample recruited through advertising, Warling (2001) asked mock jurors to read a written 
description of a trial involving a juvenile defendant whose age was identified as either 13, 
17, or 25 years. Results indicated that although age did not affect jurors’ verdicts or 
ratings of guilt, shorter sentences were meted out to younger juveniles (Warling). 
Warling also found that mock jurors who self-identified as holding legally conservative 
views were more likely to convict regardless of age.  
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Building upon this earlier research, Warling and Peterson-Badali (2003) again 
investigated whether the age of a defendant would affect juridical decision-making. Mock 
jurors were comprised of one sample of university students and another sample drawn 
from the general public to better approximate the jury pool (Warling and Peterson-
Badali). Each participant provided both a verdict and sentence length based upon a 
hypothetical trial transcript of a defendant charged with second-degree murder (Warling 
and Peterson-Badali). The defendant again was identified as being either 13, 17, or 25 
years of age (Warling and Peterson-Badali). Again, results indicated that although verdict 
was unaffected by age, sentence length varied by age, with the younger defendants 
receiving a lighter sentence than either the older juvenile or the adult defendant (Warling 
and Peterson-Badali). In a companion study, results also indicated that whether 
deliberations were conducted individually or in groups did not impact the age effects 
found earlier (Warling and Peterson-Badali). Additionally, upon closer examination of 
participant deliberations, mock jurors tended to use age as a mitigating factor in their 
decision-making process (Warling and Peterson-Badali).  
 
Gender as an Extralegal Factor Effecting Punishment  
 
Stereotypes of the Female Offender: Society’s Conceptions of Women’s Crimes  
 
 
Social constructions of femininity: the “good girl.”  
 
In society’s view, men who commit crime are the norm, while women are the 
exception (Pearson, 1997). Violence and aggression have been considered uniquely male 
characteristics, whereas women have been historically considered incapable of being 
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involved in social deviance (Pearson). As a result of these stereotypes, when women act 
outside of their traditional roles by behaving criminally, society asks why a woman 
would act this way (Pearson). 
 
Historical bases for current research and theory regarding gender and 
sentencing: perceptions of female offending within a historical context.  
 
Historically, in society’s view, women who committed crimes were 
fundamentally different in some way from male offenders, from whom violence was 
expected (Rasche, 1975). Based upon these stereotypical role expectations of females, 
criminologists have posited numerous theories to account for “unexpected” female 
criminality (Pearson, 1997, p.7; Rasche). Prior to 1894, research and documented interest 
in female criminality was virtually non-existent (Carlen, 1985; Rasche). There were few 
references to women in the literature, and women, generally, were not considered dangers 
to society (Datesman & Scarpitti, 1980);however, the modern conceptions of female 
criminality have their roots in this era (Carlen; Pollack, 1978; Rasche).  
Beginning with his first publication in 1894, Lombroso could be considered 
among the first major American researchers of female crime (Bowker, 1978; Vedder & 
Somerville, 1975). Using a method in which he took elaborate cranial measurements, 
Lombroso divided women into the “occasional offender” and the “born criminal” 
(Pollack, 1978). Lombroso concluded that most women fell into the former category, but 
when a woman was a born criminal she “was more terrible than the male” and “lacked 
compassion” (Rasche, 1975, p. 17). He felt that since the female criminal was an 
exception in civilized society, the female “born criminal” was an even greater exception 
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to societal rules (Rasche, p. 17). Since her “normal sister is kept in the paths of virtue by 
many causes….when a woman commits a crime, we may conclude her wickedness must 
have been enormous before it could triumph over so many obstacles” (Rasche, p. 17). In 
1895, Lombroso and Ferrero added to this theory, positing further biological bases for 
female crime (Carlen, 1985). In this work, Lombroso and Ferrero stated that women’s 
usual passivity stemmed from her ovum, which was less active than male sperm (Carlen). 
Therefore, they concluded that the active woman who commits crimes must be, 
essentially, masculine (Carlen; Temin, 1976).  
In 1907, Thomas, augmented the previous biological theories and posited socially 
based factors for female crime (Temin, 1976). To him, the female criminal was crafty and 
lured men with her sexuality (Temin). Her difficulties were caused by an inability to 
adjust to her expected feminine roles. His solution to female criminality, consequently, 
was to help women learn to conform to traditional expectations for females (Carlen, 
1985; Temin).  
Lekkerker, who visited the United States to study female reformatories during the 
1920s, was among the first to notice the differential treatment of women within the 
justice system. She noted that women were often diverted out of the system without 
formal trial through methods like probation (Rasche, 1975). She commented:  
The fact is, that from the beginning women delinquents were much more regarded 
as erring and misguided human beings needing protection and help than as 
dangerous criminals against whom social order should be protected….The more 
serious and violent offenses…are not often committed by women and even in 
those cases the public is frequently more inclined to find condoning explanations 
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than if it concerns men” (Rasche, p. 21).  
Moreover, she observed while men were feared, women were viewed as benign and 
incapable of posing a threat to society. “In the eyes of the public” there “has always been 
something pathetic about the disgraced and dishonored” female criminal (Rasche, p. 21).  
Several years later, in 1934, Glueck and Glueck examined the causes of female 
criminality (Raeche, 1974; Vedder & Somerville, 1975). They followed these women 
longitudinally, even years after their release. Creating another of the first of female 
criminality theories based upon social factors, the Gluecks concluded that female 
criminality was the result of the combination of mental inferiority, economic hardship, 
lack of education, and familial instability (Glueck & Glueck; Raeche).  
Nonetheless, despite the introduction of social factors in theories of female 
criminality, in the literature, biology continued to be among the primary etiologies of 
female crime discussed. Otto Pollack (1950) asserted that women’s criminality appeared 
to be less frequent than men’s because women were more deceitful and benefited from 
the chivalry of police (Carlen, 1985; Temin, 1976; Pollak, Vedder & Somerville, 1975). 
He posited that their deceitfulness was due to the passive role that they assumed during 
intercourse (Carlen). Moreover, he commented that criminologists traditionally believed 
“women commit fewer crimes and that when they do so they somehow betray their 
womanhood by venturing out into a reserve of men” (Carlen, p. 4). Finally, as late as 
1968, Cowie, Cowie, and Slater stated that female crime was due to a genetic imbalance 
that caused women to behave in more masculine ways (Campbell, 1981; Carlen).  
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Current theories about treatment of females within the legal system: Is it better to 
be female?  
 
While many of these historical theories may now seem outdated, they have 
influenced more recent research and theory about gender and criminality (Campbell, 
1981). From these theories have sprung hypotheses concerning the reasons why men and 
women are treated differently by the criminal justice system (Campbell). When the 
literature is examined, three primary hypotheses rooted in these early examinations of 
female criminality emerge to explain why gender affects the treatment of females in the 
justice system; however, these theories produce contradictory outcomes for women. 
These hypotheses can be divided into: (1) those that predict more lenient treatment for 
women than for men (e.g., Pearson, 1997); (2) those that predict harsher treatment for 
women compared to men (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005); and (3) those that predict no 
difference between the treatment of males and females in the justice system (Simon and 
Sharma, 1979). Proponents of the first theory (e.g., Pearson; Julian, 1993) argue that 
factfinders are less likely to punish women as harshly as men due to factors such as 
chivalry, perceived naiveté of women, or for more practical reasons, such as the fact that 
they may have young children at home (Pearson). In contrast, others believe that women 
are treated more harshly within the criminal system because they have violated social 
mores by committing crimes (Simon & Ahn-Redding). Finally, some studies have found 
no differences between treatment females and males during adjudication (e.g., Simon and 
Sharma).  
 
 
   13
Past Evidence for Theory 1: Women are Treated Less Harshly Due to Chivalry, 
Perceived Naiveté of Women, and Child Rearing  
 
The basic hypothesis.  
 
According to this hypothesis, judges and juries treat women less harshly than men 
who commit similar crimes (Pearson, 1997). This theory posits that factfinders treat 
women differently due to feelings of chivalry and perceived naiveté, as well as women’s 
child rearing duties. Similar to Lekkerker’s observations in the late 1800’s, society takes 
pity on the female criminal (Julian, 1993). Judges and jurors feel a need to protect women 
more than men accused of comparable crimes and, because they are not viewed as serious 
threats to society, the public is more likely to “find condoning explanations” for female 
criminal behavior (Rasche, 1975, p. 21). Further, related to the earlier notions of females, 
such as those of Lombroso discussed above, society may believe that women are 
incapable of crime, and since it is against their nature, they must have been led into such 
evil acts by others (Campbell, 1981). Finally, judges and jurors may believe that putting 
women with children in prison will be more detrimental than beneficial to society 
(Julian).  
 
Research demonstrating that women tend to be treated less harshly than men  
 
 
A number of studies have provided evidence that women are treated less harshly 
than men in the criminal system. First, Ghali and Chesney-Lind (1986) did not find a 
gender effect for verdict but did find an effect of gender on sentencing. Specifically, they 
found that females were more likely than males to receive probation when legal and 
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social variables were controlled (Ghali & Chesney Lind; Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005). 
Nagel and Weitzman (1971) reached similar conclusions. They found that women were 
more likely to be released on bail pre-trial, more likely to have their cases dismissed or be 
acquitted, and if convicted, more likely to receive suspended sentences or probation 
(Nagel & Weitzman). Based on these data, Nagel and Weitzman concluded that women 
were nearly always treated preferentially, except in the case of assault, which will be 
discussed later (Nagel & Weitzman). Finally, in an examination of 309 criminal cases, 
Frazier, Wilbur, and Henretta (1983) also found that women were more likely than men 
to receive lighter punishment. Further, independent of other potential influences, females 
were more likely to receive recommendations from probations officers for non-
incarceration sentences, which in turn was the best predictor of final judicial decisions 
regarding sentence (Frazier, Wilbur, & Henretta).  
In another study, male judges were found to affix more lenient sentences for 
women than men (Wrightsman, Nietzel, & Fortune, 1988). In an examination of 10,500 
cases, researchers found that while women and men were arrested at similar rates and 
plead guilty at similar rates, women still received lesser punishments for similar crimes 
(Wrightsman, Nietzel, & Fortune). In particular, the study found that they were more 
likely to have their sentence suspended and less likely to serve time in prison 
(Wrightsman, Nietzel, & Fortune).  
Two studies also found that women are treated preferentially in sentencing for 
violent crimes (Pearson, 1997). In the first study, researchers found that, for violent 
crimes, men were 11 percent more likely to be imprisoned (Pearson). In the second study, 
researchers concluded that, as of 1996, men convicted of killing their wives received an 
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average sentence of 16 years, whereas, women convicted of killing their husbands 
received an average sentence of only 6 years (Pearson).  
In addition to the above studies, state statistics also indicate that women are 
receiving preferential treatment in the justice system (Pearson, 1997). For example, data 
from New York in 1986, demonstrated that while 77% of men convicted of homicide 
went to prison, only 48% of women convicted of homicide served a prison sentence 
(Pearson). Statistics collected by the city of Phoenix in Arizona examining 2,500 
offenders found that men were two times more likely to be incarcerated compared to 
women (Pearson).  
 
Research providing support for the rationales behind the more lenient treatment 
of women.  
 
Studies have not only shown that women tend to be treated less harshly, but 
researchers also have presented several rationales for these effects, including chivalry 
(Demleitner, Berman, Miller, & Wright, 2004), perceived naiveté of women (Campbell, 
1981), and the child rearing responsibilities of women (Crites, 1976; Simon & Ahn-
Redding, 2005). First, factfinders (i.e., mostly male judges) view women as in need of 
protection or chivalry (Demleitner et al.). When asked, judges stated that they could not 
help comparing female defendants to their wives or mothers, individuals they could not 
imagine engaging in the conduct of which the defendant was accused (Simon & Ahn-
Redding). Musolino (1988) interviewed a total of twelve judges in the Washington D.C. 
area about their differential treatment of men and women. All but one judge affirmed that 
they did treat the sexes differently (Simon & Ahn-Redding). One of the main rationales 
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judges provided was that they had been taught to be chivalrous toward women (Simon & 
Ahn-Redding). For example, one judge commented, “I am more lenient toward women, 
and I’ve just not been able to grasp why that is, except I love my mother very much” 
(Simon & Ahn-Redding).  Another stated that women were less likely to recidivate 
because incarceration is much more degrading for females than it is for males. Based 
upon this data, these researchers believed that judges were more lenient in sentencing 
women, but that gender did not effect their determination of guilt (Simon & Ahn-
Redding).  
Another examination of judges’ rationales revealed similarly sympathetic and 
chivalrous behavior (Pearson, 1997). Among the findings of this study were that judges 
believed that women were less culpable for their crimes, more rehabilitatable, and less 
dangerous than their male codefendants. One judge commented, “This is a masculine 
system. When a woman enters into it, your train of thinking gets derailed. All the more 
acutely when it’s a girl.” (Pearson, p. 62).  
Another, less studied variable, economics, has also been proposed to account for 
the leniency hypothesis based on chivalry. Kruttschitt broke down the larger category of 
women into different subcategories and studied the effects of chivalry on sentencing. 
Kruttschitt found that women who were more “respectable” or economically better off 
were more likely to be treated leniently, receiving the benefits of judges’ chivalry (Simon 
& Ahn-Redding, 2005).  
In addition to chivalry, judges, in research, often cite women’s needs to care for 
dependent children as a rationale for less severe punishment (Crites, 1976; Simon & Ahn-
Redding, 2005). Due to the fact that most women defendants are single parents, 
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incarceration can leave children without caretakers (Simon & Ahn-Redding). Therefore, 
judges in one study believed a burden would be placed on society if mothers were 
imprisoned (Simon & Ahn-Redding). A study in Los Angeles with over 10,500 
participants supported this rationale. Researchers found that judges were more lenient 
with female offenders, especially when the women had young children for whom they 
were the sole caretakers (Simon & Ahn-Redding). In addition, research conducted by 
Daley provided a more in-depth exploration of these familial extralegal variables. Like 
the research discussed above, Daley found that existence of a family made women less 
likely to receive harsh punishment. When judges were asked about their rationales for 
these shorter sentences, they stated that they were motivated by concern over the 
women’s dependent children, rather than traditional notions of chivalry (Simon & Ahn-
Redding). Finally, in the 1988 Musolino study of Washington D.C. area judges discussed 
above, researchers found the other main theme judges cited for their differential treatment 
of females and males was the greater child care responsibilities of women (Simon & 
Ahn-Redding). Other research similarly has found that women with children and married 
women were likely to receive more lenient sentences (Simon & Ahn-Redding).  
 
Past Evidence for Theory 2: Women are Treated More Harshly for Violating Social 
Norms  
 
 
The basic hypothesis.  
 
One can see the roots of the role violation hypothesis in the research of Thomas 
discussed above, who stated that women were expected to conform to traditional roles, as 
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well as that of Otto who stated that women “betray their womanhood” by committing 
crimes (Temin, 1976). In other words, this theory posits that males are expected to 
commit crimes, but females are not. As noted above, historically, women were expected 
to exhibit certain stereotypical behaviors, and committing crimes violates such 
expectations. Consequently, when a judge finds a woman guilty of a crime, he or she is 
likely to “throw the book” at the female defendant (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005). 
According to this theory, factfinders should react more harshly to women who have 
transgressed society’s expectations for women, punishing women not just for their 
offenses, but also for stepping outside of their feminine roles (Simon & Ahn-Redding).  
 
Historical evidence that women tend to be treated more harshly than men.  
 
Proponents of this point of view (e.g., Temen, 1973) point to two primary pieces of 
evidence that support the harsher treatment of women in the criminal system. First, 
historically, statutes have explicitly treated women and men differently (e.g., Ex Parte 
Brady, 1927; Platt v. Commonwealth, 1926; State v. Heitman, 1919). Under these 
statutes, convicted males had their minimum sentence determined by a judge in an open 
hearing, with counsel present. In contrast, women’s minimum sentences were decided in 
a closed hearing by a parole board, and counsel was not provided (Simon & Ahn-
Redding, 2005). Under these differing procedures, women were not given the due process 
protections afforded males (Simon & Ahn-Redding). Instead, under the rationale that 
women should be protected, their sentences were left to the whims of the parole board, 
allowing them to hold women as long as necessary for their “rehabilitation” (Simon & 
Ann-Redding, 2005).  
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Second, in the past, statutes providing for indeterminate sentencing of women were 
also sanctioned (Richey Mann, 1984). For example, in discussing the latter of these two, 
now defunct, procedural mechanisms, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the 
practice of allowing indeterminate sentences for women, but not men, stating that the 
legislature could have reasonably believed that women, as a class, should receive this 
treatment in order to “match” “the time of incarceration” to “the necessary treatment…to 
provide…effective rehabilitation.” (Commonwealth v. Daniel, 1967, p. 164; Simon & 
Ahn-Redding, 2005, p. 77). The court, providing the rationale behind its decision stated 
“such a conclusion could be made based on the psychological and physiological makeup 
of women” and “their reaction as a class to imprisonment.” (Commonwealth v. Daniel, 
1967, p. 164; Simon & Ahn-Redding, p. 77). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled 
this decision, finding no violation of the Equal Protection Clause; the ruling stated that 
the judges could not “discern any reasonable and justifiable difference or deterrents 
between men and women which would justify a man being eligible for a shorter 
maximum prison sentence than a woman for the commission of the same crime, 
especially if there is no material difference in their records and the relevant 
circumstances” (Commonwealth v. Daniel, 1968, p. 650). In response, the legislature 
enacted a statute that provided for another type of indeterminate sentencing (Richey 
Mann). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then held that statute unconstitutional, ending 
government sanctioned discrepant treatment in sentencing based on gender in 
Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Daniel, 1968; Richey Mann; Simon & Ahn-Redding; 
Temin, 1976).  
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Research demonstrating that women tend to be treated more harshly than men.  
 
In addition to the historical evidence that statutory provisions may have lead to the 
harsher treatment of women, research also supports the gender role violation hypothesis. 
For example, Ghali and Chesney-Lind (1986), found evidence that women were 
sometimes treated more harshly than men for similar crimes. In particular, their data 
indicated that, for less serious offenses, women who were arrested were more likely to be 
prosecuted than were men who were arrested. In addition, they were more likely to plead 
guilty to these lesser offenses (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005).  
Another study found that women were more likely to be subject to severe 
sentences when they did not conform to female stereotypes (Chesney-Lind, 1997). For 
example, if the female defendant was a bad mother and abused or neglected her children, 
she was more likely to receive a harsher sentence (Chesney-Lind). Further, research by 
Nagel and Weitzman (1971) found that while women were treated less harshly in most 
cases, when charged with assault, their sentences were closer to those of their male 
counterparts. They hypothesized that assault was a more male-like crime, and therefore, 
women paid a price for violating gender stereotypes and were punished more like men 
(Nagel & Weitzman; Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005).  
Finally, a body of literature on the “backlash effect” has emerged that provides 
indirect support for the hypothesis that women are treated more harshly in the legal 
system due to stereotype violations. Specifically, the social psychology literature has 
demonstrated that individuals are socially and economically sanctioned for 
counterstereotypical behavior (e.g., Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Gender stereotypes are 
among those that have demonstrated this “backlash effect” (Rudman & Fairchild). A 
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number of studies have demonstrated that females and males who violate expected 
gender roles are treated harshly, and those who commit gender role violations sometimes 
attempt to hide their counterstereotypical behavior (Redman & Fairchild). For example, 
Redman and Fairchild found that, after losing a contest to a confederate, men and women 
were likely to sabotage atypical or counterstereotypical men and women, but not those 
who conformed to gender role expectations. Further, participants who were given 
feedback on a test indicating that they had violated gender stereotypes attempted to hide 
this deviation due to fear of backlash (Redman & Fairchild).  
Some evidence has indicated that backlash begins very early in life for children. 
In one study, researchers found that even nursery and preschool children demonstrated 
similar behaviors to those discussed above (Lamb, Easterbrook & Holden, 1980). Results 
showed that, during free-play, participants reinforced each other for gender appropriate 
activities and punished one another for actions incongruent with traditional stereotypical 
male and female roles (Lamb, Easterbrook & Holden). While this effect has not been 
directly studied within the legal arena, it does have a strong body of support in varied 
contexts, thereby providing indirect evidence that women who violate stereotypical 
behaviors within the legal context may be subject to backlash as well.  
This backlash can also be seen in popular culture. An examination of 19th 
Century literature reveals that women who “misbehave” by transgressing their feminine 
roles suffer dire consequences (Alder & Worrall, 2004). During the same period, one can 
observe that the women depicted as demure and passive were praised (Alder & Worrall). 
Even during the 20th Century, study of literature reveals that women were presented as in 
need of protection and saving by males. Adler and Worrall argued that this type of 
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depiction is part of other social controls (e.g., the use of physical violence designed to 
keep women in their expected roles).  
 
Past Evidence for Theory 3: There is No Difference in the Treatment of Men And Women 
 
Not all studies, however, have found that women are punished more harshly for 
transgressing gender stereotypes. In various attempts to investigate the two hypotheses 
discussed above, researchers have also generated evidence for a third possible hypothesis 
that there is no difference between the punishment of men and women. For example, 
Simon and Sharma (1979) did not find differences in courts’ dismissal of charges, 
adjudication, or incarceration of male and female defendants. (Simon & Sharma). Two 
other studies found similar results. Kempinen found no evidence for differential 
punishment of male and female defendants in the 1970s (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005). 
More recently, in a study with results varying with the level of court studied, Ghali and 
Chesney-Lind (1986) found that, in District Courts in Honolulu, pretrial dismissal, 
adjudication, and sentencing did not differ based upon gender (Simon & Ahn-Redding).  
In a study specifically addressing the impact of gender role violation on 
punishment, Smith (2003) hypothesized that a woman who violated gender stereotypes 
would be viewed as an “evil woman” and, consequently, would be punished more 
harshly. However, Smith found no differences in criminal sanctions between women 
whose behaviors had violated traditional notions of femininity and women who 
committed crimes that did not violate gender roles. These results must be interpreted with 
caution. In explaining these unexpected results, Smith cited difficulty in creating 
   23
vignettes for the study, the lack of a representative sample, and problems discerning 
which results were the result of the effects of gender and which were the result of other 
factors (Smith).  
Box (1979) examined the phenomenon of female criminality using meta-analysis. 
Based on his study, Box concluded that “the weight of relevant evidence on women 
committing serious offenses does not give clear support to the view that they receive 
deferential, and more favorable, treatment from members of the public, police or judges” 
(Carlen, 1985, p. 5). However, he qualified his result in the case of juvenile, female 
offenders. Box remarked that when young females were arrested for relatively minor 
offenses, “Juvenile courts are often transformed into stern parental surrogates who lock 
up their naughty daughters for behaving in ways which gain scarcely concealed approval 
when committed by sons” (Carlen, p.5). However, one must take into account that this 
study was conducted during the 1970s and the number of girls in the justice system has 
increased substantially since then (Morris, 1987; Chesney-Lind, 1997).  Consequently, 
Box’s results may not be applicable today.  
 
Stereotypes of the Juvenile Female Offender: Society’s Conceptions of Girls’ Crimes  
 
The juvenile court: The development of separate adjudication for children.  
 
In the late 1800's, reformers expressed shock at the treatment of children within 
the adult system (Mack, 1909). At that time, children above age seven were adjudicated 
within adult courts, subject to the same arrest, trial, and sentencing, but also provided 
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with the same protections as adult defendants (Stapleton & Teitelbaum, 1972). 
Dissatisfied with procedures, reformers felt that the legal system should not treat children 
like their adult counterparts; they believed that the justice system needed to create 
juvenile procedures consistent with a social welfare philosophy (Besharov, 1974; Mack).  
Following these rehabilitative ideals, the juvenile justice system was born and 
became the primary system for the adjudication of juveniles (Besharov, 1974; Campbell, 
1981). Unlike the adult criminal system, the juvenile courts were created in order to 
ameliorate perceived deficits in the way children were treated (Besharov; Mack, 1909). 
However, just as women were treated differentially within the adult system, girls were 
treated differently within the juvenile system, and being a girl was a detriment (Chesney-
Lind, 1997).  
Citing the need to protect them, girls charged with status offenses (e.g., suspected 
offenses of sexuality, such as “incorrigibility”) were more likely to be institutionalized 
and held for longer periods of time than were boys charged with similar offenses 
(Chesney-Lind, 1997; Datsman & Scarpitti, 1980, Temin, 1976). In fact, girls charged 
with status offenses were treated more harshly than both girls and boys charged with acts 
considered crimes within the larger population (Chesney-Lind). For instance, one study 
of a juvenile court in Delaware found that girls who were first-time status offenders 
received harsher punishments than did boys charged with felonies (Chesney-Lind). When 
only girls who had repeatedly committed status offenses were examined, the pattern was 
even more evident, with girls being six times as likely as boys to be placed in institutions 
(Chesney-Lind).  
Legislation, such as the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
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and its recent reauthorizations, have attempted to correct this double standard (Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Act, 1992). However, often, judges have both formally and 
informally resisted these attempts and circumvented measures designed to reduce this 
imbalance (Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005). Although some studies have demonstrated 
less gender-biased treatment of status offenses (Carter, 1979; Clarke & Koch, 1980; 
Cohen & Kluegel, 1979; Dungworth, 1977, Johnson & Scheubel, 1991; Teilmann & 
Landry, 1981), other national statistics show that gender disparities persist (Chesney-
Lind, 1997).  
From this evidence it would appear that, at least within the juvenile system, the 
more discretion judges are given, the more likely that girls are to be held longer than boys 
for similar crimes. Historically, this disparity has been justified by the perceived 
increased need for protection of girls compared to their male counterparts (Chesney-Lind, 
1997). While judges' discretion in the juvenile courts was decreased in an attempt to 
balance this disparity, parallel measures do not exist within the adult system, suggesting 
that youthful girls in the adult criminal system may be treated more harshly because of 
protection-related goals.  
On the other hand, other measures exist in the adult system that, while not 
specifically intended to address this gender-discrepancy problem, may reduce the gender 
disparity (Demleitner et al., 2004). In particular, both state and federal systems have 
implemented Sentencing Guidelines, designed to provide guidance for judges in 
determining appropriate sentences (Demleitner et al.; Wrightsman, Nietzel, & Fortune, 
1988). In the past, they have provided mandatory ranges from which factfinders could not 
deviate. Consequently, extralegal variables, such as gender, could carry less weight in 
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influencing sentence lengths. Because these ranges were mandatory, judges had only a 
limited discretion in determining sentence lengths and, therefore, were less able to vary 
length of sentence by gender to give women the benefit of chivalry. (Demleitner et al.). 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court struck down mandatory sentencing guidelines in 
the federal system. In Booker and Fanfan, the Court held that the Federal Guidelines 
(Guidelines) were invalid, making them only advisory, and allowing increased judicial 
discretion (Booker, 2005). Although this decision applied only to the Federal Guidelines, 
other courts may also find it applies to states through the interpretation of their state 
constitutions (Booker). Nonetheless, although the Guidelines are only advisory, judges 
still defer strongly to the suggested range provided by the Guidelines (Demleitner et al.). 
Consequently, it is difficult to tell what role the Guidelines might play in either 
increasing or decreasing the likelihood that gender-biased judicial bias might influence 
sentence lengths.  
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CHAPTER 2:  RATIONALE 
 
Despite the fact that juveniles are often treated similarly to their adult counterparts 
in the justice system, juveniles differ from adults in many ways due to developmental 
changes associated with adolescence and early adulthood (Perkins, 2001). Juveniles may 
change dramatically over the course of years, or even several months, especially during 
adolescence (Perkins, 2001). This raises the question of whether delay in adjudication for 
months or years effects their hearing outcomes. For example, holding an older individual 
for many months for competence restoration is unlikely to affect his/her appearance, 
(e.g., physical stature). However, for a juvenile around the time of puberty, the physical 
changes during the same number of months may be dramatic (InteliHealth, 2005).  
In addition to physical changes occurring during this time, juveniles’ cognitive 
development is rapid (Grisso, 1997). Their judgment, or the ways in which they weigh 
risks and consequences, will most likely become more adult-like, resulting in an 
expanded capacity to think through options when making decisions (Grisso, 1995). 
Further, juvenile defendants may also mature emotionally. For instance, as juveniles age, 
they may become less suggestible and compliant or they may view their offenses 
differently than they did when they were younger (Goldstein et al., 2001; Koocher, 
1992). For example, if a defendant is tried at age eighteen for a crime he was accused of 
committing when he was thirteen, the way the eighteen year old defendant views the 
crime may be completely different from his point of view at the time of the alleged 
offense.  
One must wonder whether the more mature appearance, mannerisms, and 
demeanor of a child defendant following a period of delay between commission of the 
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crime and trial might change judges’ perceptions of the youth’s responsibility for the 
offense, thereby, affecting the outcome of the hearing. In other words, these 
developmental changes may cause a juvenile to both appear and act more adult-like 
during the trial than his/her younger self looked and acted when he or she committed the 
crime, thus, potentially leading to a change in judges’ perceptions of the youth’s level of 
responsibility for the offense. Defense attorney reminders to the factfinder that the 
juvenile allegedly committed this crime at a much younger age may guard against some 
of these effects. However, do such reminders truly guard against all of the possible 
changes in perceptions associated with defendants’ age?  
Unlike other extralegal variables, such as race, the research surrounding the 
extralegal effects of gender on hearing outcomes is far from clear. As demonstrated by 
the research reviewed above, it is unclear how a defendant’s gender might affect trial 
outcome. Further, much of the research that exists has investigated adult female 
defendants, while juvenile female defendants have remained largely unstudied.  
Although many extralegal variables have been shown to affect trial outcomes, only 
a small subset of these variables will be examined in the proposed study. To incorporate 
all of the relevant extralegal variables, the study sample size would require thousands of 
participants in order to reach an acceptable level of power to examine the main effects 
and interactions. Consequently, in the current study, only two of the salient variables will 
be included: age and gender. Specifically, the current study will explore the effects of age 
and gender on sentence length and other indices of judges’ perceptions of responsibility 
and culpability. The reason for selecting these variables is discussed in greater depth 
below.  
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Age  
Why is age a particularly important extralegal variable that warrants investigation? 
 
Although extant research has demonstrated that the extralegal variables of age (e.g., 
Warling, 2001) and gender (Frazier, Wilbur, & Henretta, 1983) can affect hearing 
outcomes if the child remains the same age at the time of the crime and adjudication, no 
study has attempted to examine the effects of developmental changes associated with age 
within the court context. The empirical evidence reviewed above suggests that jurors use 
age as a mitigating factor in sentencing, with defendants perceived as younger receiving 
lighter sentences (e.g., Warling, 2001; Warling & Peterson-Badali, 2003). Although these 
studies suggest that age does play a part in factfinder determinations, all of the studies 
assumed that the defendant was being tried at the same age that he or she committed the 
crime. Further, these studies only examined juror decision-making.  Given the 
demonstrated effects of age on sentencing, if juvenile defendants are perceived as older 
and more mature after a delay between the commission of the offense and adjudication, 
they may receive harsher punishments than they would have had they been tried shortly 
after the alleged offense. Thus, the proposed study will investigate how delays in 
juveniles’ hearings affect the outcomes of these hearings.  
In addition to possible risks of differential treatment in sentencing, examination of 
the effects of age on sentencing has become important in recent years for several other 
reasons. First, conservative estimates indicate that roughly 60,000 pretrial competence 
evaluations are performed annually in the United States (Redding& Frost, 2001). 
Therefore, the sheer frequency with which this issue is raised makes the investigation of 
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how being held for a length of time effects juveniles vital. Second, the issue of juvenile 
competence to stand trial is now raised more often due to the increasing frequency with 
which juveniles are tried in adult criminal courts (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000). 
Consequently, because the issue is raised more often, an increasing number of juvenile 
defendants may be held for competence restoration and, as a result, proceed to trial 
substantially after the alleged offense was committed. As a result, it is important that we 
understand how developmental variables and the changes associated with this 
development may affect a juvenile’s trial differently from that of an adult.  
 
How will the proposed study build upon past research regarding age? 
 
First, previous research in this area has assumed that the age at which the defendant 
committed the crime was the same age at which he was tried. However, in the reality of 
our justice system, this is often not the case. Defendants may be held pre-trial for 
numerous reasons, including, but not limited to, competence to stand trial evaluation and 
restoration, change of attorney, motions for change of venue, or scheduling delays. 
Further the time between the commission of the alleged crime and trial may be lengthy 
for other reasons, such as a defendant jumping bail or eluding arrest. The current study 
will account for the period of time that could elapse between a juvenile defendant’s 
alleged commission of a crime and the age at which the hearing occurs.  
Further, previous research in this area has focused almost exclusively on the effects 
of a defendant’s age on juror decisions, ignoring the decision-making processes of 
judges; however, in most cases, judges rather than juries determine outcomes. Therefore, 
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this study will explore whether judges, who are assumed to have more expertise and 
should, theoretically, be less easily swayed by extralegal influences, are also influenced 
by such extralegal variables. Further, many juveniles are adjudicated in juvenile court 
hearings and not within the adult system, therefore, it is important to examine the effects 
of age and gender within the system in which juveniles’ cases are actually heard.  
Finally, although the previous research outlined above identified defendant’s age as 
a factor in jury decision-making, extant studies have not evaluated whether age interacts 
with other extralegal factors that have been empirically identified as pertinent. Although 
the aforementioned studies suggest a defendant’s age alone may affect sentence length, 
age does not exist in a vacuum; jurors and judges simultaneously perceive many 
characteristics of the defendant (e.g., gender), and the interaction between these factors 
may affect factfinders’ decisions.  
Gender  
Why is gender a particularly important extralegal variable that warrants investigation? 
 
Gender was included in the current study because, unlike other variables, such as 
race, which have resulted in clear research outcomes, the effects of gender are 
inconclusive. It is unclear how gender may change sentencing, especially for juveniles. 
As reviewed above, several hypotheses exist concerning the effects of gender on 
sentencing, each with its own conflicting predictions. Consequently, it is important that 
the effects of this extralegal variable continue to be examined. Further, while still 
dwarfed by the number of males in the justice system, the percentage of female offenders 
is growing; this is particularly true for female juvenile offenders (Morris, 1987; Chesney-
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Lind, 1997). Therefore, it is increasingly important that we understand the role that 
gender plays in the process of adjudication.  
   
How will the proposed study build upon past research regarding gender? 
 
Given the conflicting findings of previous research, it is difficult to predict how, 
exactly, gender might affect factfinders’ decisions. Evidence supports the hypothesis that 
females may be treated more harshly than males, other evidence supports the hypothesis 
that females may be treated less harshly, and still other evidence suggests that there may 
be no difference in treatment. Complicating this picture further, however, are recent 
legislative and judicially imposed changes in the law. For example, due to statutory 
changes, children are increasingly transferred to adult criminal court for their legal 
transgressions (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000). It is difficult to tell whether, post transfer, 
judges will be more likely to treat transferred females in ways similar to the traditional 
treatment of juvenile girls or more akin to adult females. Second, in the recent Booker 
(2005) decision, the Supreme Court declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(Guidelines) unconstitutional. The Guidelines were specifically designed to root out bias 
in sentencing, whether based on gender, race, or any other extralegal variable by limiting 
judicial discretion (Demleitner et al., Berman, Miller, & Wright, 2004). In fact, section 
5H1.10 of the Guidelines explicitly stated that sex may not be used as a factor in 
sentencing, and section 5H1.6 stated that “family ties and responsibilities…are not 
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable 
guideline range” (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, § 5H1.6). Therefore, while in the past, 
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women who were the sole caretakers for children may have received leniency, during the 
Guidelines era, judges were generally restricted from considering such factors, except to 
move up or down within the prescribed guideline range (Bloom, 2003). Only in 
exceptional circumstances were family ties to form the basis for a downward departure 
from the mandated range (Bloom).  
Some studies found that the Guidelines were accomplishing their purpose of 
creating less biased sentencing. For example, by decreasing the individualization of 
sentences, increasing numbers of women were being incarcerated, especially for drug 
related crimes (Bloom, 2003; Chesney-Lind, 1997). However, others have found that, 
even during the Guidelines era, in cases where a downward departure was granted, the 
allowance of discretion reintroduced sentence disparity. One study found that “female 
defendants received departures that were nine percentage points higher than did similar 
male defendants.” (Demleitner et al., Berman, Wright, & Miller, 2004, p. 324). However, 
when the Guidelines were reduced to the status of being advisory only, judicial 
discretion, which was formerly limited by the Guidelines, was reintroduced into 
sentencing. Without this legislation to control gender bias, it is possible that we will again 
see patterns of gender differences similar to those of the pre-Guidelines era.  
Finally, previous research has not examined the interaction between gender and 
age. Consequently, as no previous research exists, it is difficult to say how these two 
variables may change the effects on hearing outcomes. However, one might hypothesize, 
based upon theory and previous research, that younger women may experience harsher 
sentences due to the fact that girls committing crimes is an even larger violation of 
traditional gender stereotypes for females. In other words, if a woman committing a 
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crime is a violation of traditional expectations for women, a girl committing a crime is a 
double aberration.  Therefore, one might hypothesize that the younger a female, the more 
harsh the punishment she will receive due to this double stereotype violation. In contrast, 
criminal activity is more expected for males.    Consequently, one could argue that they 
may be treated less severely because they are not violating traditional expectations for 
their gender.  . Further, younger males may benefit from the effects observed earlier in 
which younger individuals may profit from their youthful appearance and demeanor, 
resulting in less severe punishment for younger males. Consequently, we expected that 
the relationship between age and juveniles’ trial outcomes would depend upon gender, 
such that females would receive harsher sentences at younger ages, while males would 
benefit from their youthfulness and receive less harsh ratings on trial outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 3:  HYPOTHESES  
Main Effects 
Verdict  
1. There will be a main effect of age on verdict; older defendants will be 
convicted more often than will younger defendants for identical crimes.  
2. There will be a main effect of gender on verdict; male defendants will be 
convicted more often than will female defendants for identical crimes.  
Length of Sentence  
1. Defendants’ ages (13, 15, 17, or 24) will affect the length of sentences assigned 
(i.e., there will be a main effect for age). The older a defendant is at the time of 
trial, the longer sentence participants will assign, despite the defendants having 
allegedly committed the crimes at the same age.  
2. Defendants’ gender (male or female) will affect the length of sentences assigned 
(i.e., there will be a main effect for gender). Female defendants will receive 
shorter sentences and male defendants will receive longer sentences.  
 
Responsibility for the crime  
3. Defendant’s age (13, 15, 17, or 24) will affect assigned ratings of responsibility 
(i.e., there will be a main effect for age). The older a defendant is at the time of 
trial, the higher the guilt rating participants will assign, despite the defendants 
having allegedly committed the crimes at the same age. This is hypothesized due 
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to research and experiential evidence demonstrating that older offenders are 
treated more harshly within the judicial system.  
4. Defendants’ gender (male or female) will affect assigned ratings of responsibility 
(i.e., there will be a main effect for gender). Female defendants will receive lower 
ratings of responsibility while male defendants will receive higher ratings of 
responsibility.  
Dangerousness  
5. Defendant’s age (13, 15, 17, or 24) will affect assigned ratings of dangerousness 
(i.e., there will be a main effect for age). The older a defendant is at the time of 
trial, the higher the dangerousness rating participants will assign, despite having 
the defendants having allegedly committed the crimes at the same age.  
6. Defendants’ gender (male or female) will affect assigned ratings of dangerousness 
(i.e., there will be a main effect for gender). Female defendants will receive lower 
ratings of dangerousness while male defendants will receive higher ratings of 
dangerousness.  
Recidivism  
7. Defendant’s age (13, 15, 17, or 24) will affect assigned ratings of likelihood of 
recidivism (i.e., there will be a main effect for age). Older defendants will be more 
likely to receive higher ratings of likelihood of recidivism, while younger 
defendants will be more likely to receive lower ratings of likelihood of recidivism, 
despite defendants having allegedly committed the crimes at the same age.  
8. Defendants’ gender (male or female) will affect assigned ratings of likelihood of 
recidivism (i.e., there will be a main effect for gender). Female defendants will be 
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more likely to receive lower ratings of likelihood of recidivism while male 
defendants will be more likely to receive higher ratings of likelihood of 
recidivism.  
Interactions 
9. Older female defendants and younger male defendants will experience less harsh 
punishment (i.e., less likely to be found guilty and shorter sentences).  
 
10. Older female defendants and younger male defendants will be viewed as 
less culpable (i.e., viewed as less responsible for the crime, less dangerous, and 
less likely to recidivate).     
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CHAPTER 4:  METHOD 
Participants 
Prior research has demonstrated that judge response rates range from 20-35% 
(Redding & Reppucci, 1999). Consequently, using the more conservative finding of a 
20% response rate, 1,200 surveys were mailed to judges to achieve the desired sample 
size.  Surveys were mailed to judges who were chosen randomly from publicly available 
databases.  A 33% response rate was obtained, with 393 judges responding to the survey.  
However, after the exclusion criteria discussed below were applied 295 participants 
remained.  Judges were chosen as survey participants because judges, rather than juries, 
typically make the ultimate determinations of both verdict and sentence.  
 Although it was planned that only juvenile court judges would participate in the 
survey, upon examination of available judge databases, it was discovered that, it was 
often impossible to discern which judges heard only juvenile cases.  Furthermore, 
especially in more rural jurisdictions, judges frequently tended serve as general 
jurisdiction judges.  In other words, in less populated areas, the same judges may hear all 
cases to come before the court, and, often, the same judge may hear both juvenile and 
criminal adult cases.  Consequently, judges were asked what type of court they preside 
over and were included / excluded according to the criteria discussed below in the Results 
section.   
Design 
This study used a 4 (age: 13, 15, 17, 24) x 2 (gender: male, female) between 
subjects design. In this vignette-based study, age and gender were true independent 
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variables. The primary dependent variables were the verdict and assigned sentence 
length, as well as ratings of dangerousness, risk of recidivism, and level of responsibility. 
 
Materials 
Each judge was mailed a packet of information including: a cover letter 
introducing the study (Appendix C & D); a brief trial vignette (Appendix E); a survey 
asking what the participant believed would be the appropriate trial outcome, as well as 
his/her perception of the defendant’s level of responsibility, likelihood of recidivism and 
dangerousness (Appendix F); and a demographic questionnaire (Appendix G). The cover 
letter provided a brief description of the study, its purpose, and an invitation to 
participate. The vignette provided a hypothetical case summary. The survey questionnaire 
pertaining to the trial vignette asked about the participant’s beliefs about the defendant’s 
level of responsibility, level of dangerousness, and risk of recidivism, as well as the 
appropriate verdict and sentence length. The demographic questionnaire inquired about 
such factors as the participant’s age, race, socioeconomic status, marital status, gender, 
and whether the participant presided in an urban, suburban, or rural area.  
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of eight conditions and received 
only the vignette associated with that condition. In these vignettes, gender and age of the 
hypothetical offender were manipulated; all other defendant variables and trial-related 
information were held constant. Specifically, IQ, educational and employment status, 
mental health, and race did not vary across vignettes. The defendant was described as 
having an IQ of 80, which is roughly average for youth in the juvenile offender 
population (Klinge & Dorsey, 1993; McGaha, et al., 2001).  Participants were told that 
the defendant completed the 8th grade and does odd jobs for neighbors, such as mowing 
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lawns, shoveling snow, and washing cars. The case summary also described the 
defendant as suffering from Major Depression, as this is a common diagnosis (DSM-IV-
TR, 2000), especially within the juvenile forensic population (McGaha, et al., 2001). The 
defendant was identified as African American because African Americans in the United 
States are disproportionately arrested, charged, and sentenced (Demleitner et al., 2004).  
Procedure 
The research materials were mailed to a nationwide sample of judges randomly 
selected from publicly available, web-based and published directories. The United States 
was divided into 10 geographical regions based upon regional classification contained in 
publicly available websites, such as the Library of Congress (Library of Congress, 2007), 
and United States Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau). One hundred twenty judges 
were randomly chosen from each region, for a total of 1200 judges.  New Jersey judges 
were excluded due to a state restriction on judges’ participation in research. Judges were 
not asked for any identifying information and were instructed not to provide identifying 
information on any materials. Further, a self-addressed stamped envelope was provided 
to facilitate ease of returning the survey. Finally, approximately two weeks after the 
initial mailing, a reminder letter was sent to encourage those that intended to participate 
to return their completed packets. Included in this letter was an explanation that the study 
was anonymous, so it was not possible to determine who had already returned the 
materials a statement of thanks to those who had already returned the research materials. 
A second copy of the survey was mailed to each potential participant along with the 
reminder letter.  
Within each packet, the materials were presented in the following order: cover 
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letter, vignette, outcomes questionnaire, and demographics questionnaire. The 
demographics questionnaire was the final item in the packet because one of the items 
inquires about the participant’s race. Previous research has found that when participants 
are asked to provide their race prior to completing other measures, their performance on 
those measures changes (Wicherts, Dolan, & Hessen, 2005); therefore, the demographics 
questionnaire was the final item in the packet in order to guard against such effects. 
Method of Analysis 
An a priori power analysis revealed that, for a 2 x 4 MANOVA, with an alpha of 
.05, and a medium effect size (f =.25) estimated for all main effects and interactions, 240 
participants would be needed to achieve a power of .80.  For reasons discussed below, it 
was not possible to use MANOVA; therefore, a series of ANOVAs were conducted.  
Three hundred and ninety-three surveys were returned and 295 of those were included in 
analyses. Two hundred and ninety five participants, with an alpha level of .05, produced a 
power of .99 to detect a large effect (f=.4) and a power of .89 to detect a medium effect 
(f=.25). 
To test for the proposed main effects and interactions on the dependant variables 
of sentence length, responsibility, dangerousness, and likelihood of recidivism, a 2 
(gender: male or female) x 4 (age of defendant: 13, 15, 17, 24) between subjects 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was originally planned.  MANOVA was 
proposed, rather than a series of ANOVA equations, to reduce the probability of Type I 
error (Field, 2007).  MANOVA would have been appropriate to use for these analyses 
because all of the dependent variables were, theoretically, correlated.  It was planned that 
Tukey’s HSD would be used for planned comparisons if the overall F-test showed that 
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the means of the dependent variables were not the same for all groups formed by the 
categories of independent variables.  For reasons discussed below, the proposed analyses 
were altered after the data were obtained and inspected.   
A logistic regression equation (verdict = a + b1 (age) + b2 (gender) + b3 
(age)(gender) was used to examine the main effects of age and gender on verdict, as well 
as the interaction between age and gender.  Verdict was regressed simultaneously on age, 
gender, and the product term of age and gender (all predictor variables were centered 
prior to running the analysis).  
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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Excluded Participants 
To determine whether a random sample of the 10 geographical regions was 
obtained, a one-way ANOVA was performed; results were not significant [F (3, 287) = 
.897, p = .443], indicating no differences in response rates between regions.   
Two criteria were used to exclude judges from the sample.  First, judges who had 
not heard a case involving a juvenile who had committed a crime within the last year 
were removed (n=85), as were judges who did not answer the question about whether 
they had heard a juvenile case in the previous year (n=6).  Second, judges who responded 
that they only heard civil matters were excluded (n=19).   All judges specified the type of 
court in which they presided; therefore, it was unnecessary to exclude judges based on 
omission of that information.  After these inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied, 295 
of the original 393 judges remained in the sample.   
Of the included judges, 78% were male, 19% were female, and 3% declined to 
answer that item.  The racial composition of the sample was 90% White (Not Hispanic), 
3% Latino or Hispanic, 1% African American, 1% Asian, 2% Other; 3% chose not to 
answer that item.  Thirty-six percent of judges were located in suburban areas, 33% lived 
in rural areas, and 28% lived in urban areas; 3% did not answer the question.  Judges 
were asked to rate their political views from one (Liberal) to six (Conservative).  The 
mean political orientation was 3.6 (SD = 1.15).   
Some judges declined to answer the questions posed, stating they needed 
additional information in the vignette.  Of the 17 questions posed, 25 judges declined to 
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answer three questions, 15 judges declined to answer two questions, and 8 declined to 
answer one question. Five judges completed the survey but, also, commented on the 
brevity of the vignette. 
Demographic Data 
To identify any potential differences in ratings between participants, based on 
their reported demographics, we conducted a series of ANOVAs, with 7 pertinent 
demographic characteristics as independent variables and judge’s ratings as dependent 
variables.  One way ANOVAs indicated conditions were not significantly different across 
judges’ age, gender, race, annual income, marital status, area, and political view (See 
Tables 1, 2, 3, &4)  
Because having correlated dependent variables is an assumption of MANOVA, 
prior to running analyses, correlations between all dependant variables (responsibility, 
dangerousness, recidivism, and sentence length) were examined (See Table 5).  All 
dependent variables were correlated.  Perceived level of responsibility and sentence 
length were correlated at the .05 alpha level, and all other correlations were significant at 
the .01 level. 
The Effect of Defendants’ Age and Gender on Judges’ Ratings Of Defendants’ 
Likelihood Of Recidivism, Dangerousness, Responsibility, And Appropriate Sentence 
Length 
 
We planned to conduct a MANOVA to evaluate whether judges’ ratings of a 
defendant’s recidivisim, dangerousness, responsibility, and appropriate sentence length 
differed depending upon the defendant’s age and gender.  However, as discussed below, 
the assumptions underlying MANOVA were not met; therefore, this type of analysis was 
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not possible.    
Prior to running the analyses, the assumptions underlying MANOVA were 
evaluated.  First, the assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance was examined 
using Box’s M Test, and a violation was revealed.  However, because the degrees of 
freedom for this test can be large, the test is oversensitive (Huberty & Olejnik, 2006).  
Consequently, the variance determinants were also examined and indicated that the 
variance was unequal.  Because this can be due to multivariate non-normality (Huberty & 
Olejnik, 2006), multivariate normality was examined next.  Because there is no way to 
directly assess multivariate normality, univariate normality must be examined for each 
variable (Huberty & Olejnik, 2006).  Examination of tests of normality, using both 
graphical methods (see Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4), and the Shapiro-Wilk test for all eight 
groups, revealed that the data were not normally distributed, (all W’s >.45; all p-
values<.0001).  Due to the violation of this assumption, it was not possible to use the 
planned MANOVA.   
Because a MANOVA was not possible, hypotheses were examined using a series 
of two-way factorial ANOVAs, using responsibility, recidivism, dangerousness, and 
sentence length as the dependent variables.  With all dependent variables, we found no 
significant main effects for gender on responsibility, likelihood of recidivism, 
dangerousness, and sentence length and no significant interactions between gender and 
age of defendant on responsibility, likelihood of recidivism, dangerousness, and sentence 
length.  A significant main effect of defendant age was found for dangerousness and 
recidivism (See Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9).  
A series of planned contrasts were conducted using dangerousness and recidivism 
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as dependant variables, and age group as the independent variable. Each age group was 
compared sequentially with the next group, resulting in three contrasts, total.  
Specifically, results from the 13-year-old defendant were contrasted with those of the 15-
year-old defendant, 15-year-old defendant’s results were contrasted with the 17-year-old 
defendants’, and 17-year-old’s results were contrasted with those of the 24-year-old 
defendant.  When dangerousness was examined by age, no statistically significant 
differences were detected (See Table 10).  When recidivism was examined by age, 
statistically significant differences were found between the 17 and 24 year old.   No other 
age groups differed on likelihood of recidivism.  (See Table 10).   
 
Prediction of Judges’ Verdicts Based Upon Defendant’s Age And Gender 
 
Logistic regression was used to determine if defendant’s age and gender were 
associated with judges’ verdicts.  Analyses indicated that the overall model containing 
gender and age was not significantly associated with the probability of judges’ verdicts, 
(X2 (6) = 2.30; p > .10; R2N =.007).  Further, the individual regression coefficients 
indicated that neither gender (Wald X2 (1) = 0.82; p > .10; B = -.73), nor age (Wald X2 (1) 
= 0.11; p > .10; B = -.074), nor the interaction between age and gender (Wald X2 (1) = 
.411, p>.10, B = .180) predicted verdict.   
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Effect of Judge Demographic Characteristics on Judges’ Ratings of Sentence Length, 
Responsibility, Likelihood of Recidivism, and Dangerousness 
 
 A series of one-way ANOVAs were also used to examine whether judges’ 
demographic characteristics were associated with their decisions regarding juvenile 
defendants’ trial outcomes.  Results revealed that judges’ ratings of the appropriate 
sentence, likelihood of recidivism, responsibility for the crime, and dangerousness were 
not associated with judges’ political views, age, gender, racial group, annual income, 
marital status, area of residence, frequency of interaction with juveniles, or the type of 
court in which they presided. 
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CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION 
This study sought to investigate the effects of a defendant’s age and gender on 
judge’s ratings of recidivism, responsibility, dangerousness, sentence length, and verdict.  
It was hypothesized that a defendant’s age and gender, as well as the interaction between 
these variables, would affect judges’ ratings of verdict, sentence length, responsibility, 
likelihood of recidivism, and dangerousness.   
Gender 
Previous research has supported three separate and contradictory hypotheses 
about the effects of gender on trial outcomes:  (1) women are treated less harshly than 
men due to notions of chivalry, perceived naiveté, and child rearing duties; (2) women 
are treated more harshly than men due to violations of social norms by committing 
crimes; and (3) there is no difference between the treatment of men and women within 
the justice system.  With regard to gender, this study supported the third hypothesis, 
finding no effect of gender on any of the dependent variables.  In other words, gender 
was not found to affect judges’ verdicts, assigned sentence lengths, or ratings of 
responsibility, likelihood of recidivism, or dangerousness.  Further, no interaction was 
found between age and gender on any of the dependent variables.   
Several possible explanations exist that may account for the lack of gender effect.  
First, judges’ decisions may be unaffected by the gender of defendants.  Many previous 
studies (e.g., Campbell, 1981; Musolino, 1988; Simon & Ahn-Redding, 2005) have 
focused on the effects of gender on juror decision-making.  It may be that judges, who 
have more experience and expertise, may be less swayed by this extralegal variable than 
jurors.  However, evaluation of this proposal is not possible in the current study due to 
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the lack of a direct comparison between judges’ and jurors’ decision making.   
Another possible explanation for the current results is that social expectations for 
females have changed since the time the research discussed above was conducted.    
Many of the studies cited as a basis for the hypotheses in this study were conducted in 
previous decades.   During the time that research was conducted, women may have been 
treated more harshly due to social norm violations or women may have been treated more 
leniently due to notions of chivalry or the expectation that women occupy a child-rearing 
role.  Today, these roles and expectations may be different.  For instance, traditional 
social roles are changing -- women are increasingly primary breadwinners (United States 
Census Bureau, 2000), and men often undertake a significant amount of childrearing 
responsibilities (United States Census Bureau, 2000).  Furthermore, women are 
increasingly involved in the judicial system; the population of both adult female (United 
States Department of Justice, 1998) and juvenile female offenders (Poe-Yamagata & 
Butts, 1996; United States Department of Justice, 1998) is rising disproportionately to 
their male counterparts. Consequently, due to changes in traditional roles and general 
expectations, it is possible that, currently, women are simply treated as equal to their 
male counterparts within the justice system. 
The current findings may also be due to the fact that a third variable, not included 
in the study, actually accounts for the relationship between gender and trial outcomes.  
For example, as previously discussed, earlier studies found that, with female offenders, 
the relationship between trial outcomes and gender may be related to the type of crime 
committed (Chesney-Lind, 1997; Nagel & Weitzman, 1971; Simon & Ahn-Redding, 
2005).  Although the crime incorporated into the current study was selected because we 
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thought we could avoid these effects by choosing a crime that was neither too serious nor 
too minor, it is possible that type of crime did play a role.  It is also possible that other 
variables that have been found in past research to affect the relationship between gender 
and trial outcomes, such as “respectability” of female defendants (Simon & Ahn-
Redding, 2005), account for these effects.   
In past research, it has been found that certain racial groups are filtered out of the 
justice system prior to adjudication (Demleitner, 2004).  In particular, white defendants 
may never reach adjudication because police and prosecutors may arrest and charge these 
defendants at disproportionately lower rates than those of their minority counterparts 
(Demleitner, 2004).  It is possible that a similar phenomenon may occur with gender.  It 
is possible that women are filtered out of the system prior to reaching adjudication, and 
the women who do reach adjudication are seen as more like their male counterparts and, 
therefore, deserving of the same punishments.   In other words, women may still benefit 
from the protective effects of their gender prior to the adjudication process, in the form of 
informal diversion prior to adjudication.  However, this study does suggest that they may 
be treated similarly to their male counterparts with respect to trial outcomes.  
As discussed above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were determined to be 
unconstitutional in Booker (United States v. Booker, 2005).  It is possible that judges 
continue to follow the Guidelines, even though they are now advisory, thereby, 
continuing the lack of disparity based upon extralegal factors seen during the Guidelines 
era.   
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Age 
 The current study hypothesized that younger defendants would be treated less 
harshly than their adult counterparts.  A main effect was observed for age on 
dangerousness and recidivism, but not on verdict, sentence length, or responsibility.  
However, these age effects were in the opposite direction from those predicted.  
Specifically, judges rated younger defendants as more likely to recidivate and more 
dangerous. Several factors may account for these counterintuitive results.  First, 
congruence between behavior and stereotypes could have played a role.  Previous 
research has revealed that, because mock jurors associated certain races with certain 
crimes, when a defendant of a particular race commits a crime consistent with the 
stereotype, participants were more likely to find that defendant guilty (e.g., Jones & 
Kaplan, 2003).  An analogous phenomenon may have occurred in the current study, but 
with age based stereotypes instead of race.  Judges may have stereotypes about the types 
of crimes that juveniles commit.  Therefore, the juvenile defendants in the vignette, who 
committed crimes seen as congruent with his or her youthful status, may have been 
treated more harshly.  If behavior was more consistent with expectations, judges may 
have seen the crimes committed in the hypothetical vignettes as more congruent with 
juvenile offenders; therefore, the judges may have been more likely to ascribe higher 
ratings of recidivism and dangerousness to younger juveniles than to older juveniles or 
adults.  In the other direction, judges may not have viewed the crime scenarios as 
congruent with adult stereotypes and, therefore, provided lower ratings of recidivism and 
dangerousness for older offenders.  Consequently, the type of crime included in this study 
may account for the disparity between previous age-related findings and results of the 
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current study. 
Second, because defendants in the vignettes were not arrested for any additional 
crimes since the described arrest, judges may have felt that older youth, who had longer 
periods in which to commit other crimes, were less likely to recidivate in the future.  
Consistent with this reasoning, judges also rated older defendants as less dangerous than 
younger defendants.   
 
Interaction Between Gender and Age 
 
No extant research has investigated the interaction between age and gender on 
trial outcomes.  It was hypothesized that an interaction between defendant’s age and 
gender would be found.  Specifically, we proposed that older female and younger male 
defendants would receive less harsh punishments, while younger females and older males 
would receive harsher punishment.  We believed that younger females, who violated 
social roles by committing crimes, would not benefit from their youth because young 
girls’ criminal activity is such an extreme violation of society’s expectations, and, 
therefore, judges would treat them harshly.  In contrast, adult females would benefit from 
their gender, and not suffer from this more extreme stereotype violation; therefore, they 
would be seen as less culpable and treated less harshly.  Males would not be violating 
social expectations because criminal activity is more consistent with gender expectations.   
Consequently, we predicted that younger males would receive the full benefit of their 
youthful status. Despite these predictions, no such interaction was observed.  The current 
results, therefore, suggest that the observed relationship between age and measures of 
trial outcome may not depend upon a defendant’s gender.   
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Judge Demographic Characteristics 
 
 Judges’ decision making in juveniles trials did not appear to vary with the judges’ 
demographic characteristics.  For example, male and female judges did not differ in their 
decisions regarding cases.  Judges’ of different racial groups, political views, income 
levels, and martial status, also did not differ in their ratings.  Judges ratings did not differ 
depending upon whether they were located in urban, suburban, or rural areas, nor did 
they differ depending upon whether the judges presided in juvenile court, criminal court, 
or some other type of court.  These findings suggest that juveniles’ trial outcomes may 
not be affected by the demographic characteristics of the judges presiding over their 
hearings. 
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CHAPTER 7:  LIMITATIONS 
 
This study was designed to examine the role of a delayed trial (i.e., delay before 
time of arrest or a period of competence restoration) on trial outcomes and judicial 
decision making.  It also incorporated defendant’s gender, another factor that has been 
shown to influence decision making in other contexts.  However, research has 
demonstrated that other variables, such as race, ethnicity, intelligence, and mental health, 
can also affect juror decision making, and these important factors were not incorporated 
into this study due to practical considerations, such as the sample size that would have 
been required and interpretability of results. Nonetheless, this research was a first step in 
incorporating multiple case-related factors into a single study in order to better 
understand the ways in which they might interact within the trial context.  
Another limitation of this study is the possibility of response bias.  Judges who 
returned the mail surveys differ may in some ways from judges who did not complete the 
survey.  Given the 33% return rate, responses may not represent the larger population of 
judges.  However, attempts were made to make the sample as representative as possible 
of United States judges by obtaining a national sample and encouraging response through 
duplicate mailings.  Furthermore, the participation rate was consistent with most previous 
research with this population (Redding & Repucci, 1999). 
The proposed study is also limited by the lack of visual cues indicating 
defendant’s age. Similar to the impact of “babyfacedness” (McArthur & Aptow, 1984; 
Zebrowitz & Montepare, 1990; Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004), it may be that age-
related visual cues, rather than age per se, determines the effects of age on trial outcomes. 
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In order to test this hypothesis, one would have to use pictures of the same individual at 
different ages, while also controlling for factors such as attractiveness, variability in 
clothing, and threatening nature of appearance. We can imagine accomplishing this level 
of control only through computerized techniques, such as morphing, which are extremely 
expensive and cost-prohibitive for the current study.  
Another limitation of the current study is that we did not include any jurors as 
participants.  The current study only incorporated judges; therefore, findings may not be 
applicable to jurors’ decision making. While in a smaller proportion of cases, jurors do 
make decisions regarding defendant’s trial outcomes; however, they may reach decisions 
in a manner different from judges.  For example, it is possible that jurors may be more or 
less influenced than judges by extralegal factors, such as age and gender.  Further, jurors 
deliberate in groups, which has been shown to affect their decisions in some cases 
(Blumberg, 1994; Bagby, Parker, Rector, & Kelemba, 1994).  Consequently, the current 
research cannot be generalized to jurors.  
Further, the case summary vignettes are abbreviated, compared with an actual 
trial transcript. Therefore, the current study is subject to all of the traditional criticisms of 
jury research, particularly that results may not be ecologically valid. However, it is not 
practical to incorporate an entire trial transcript because participants, particularly judges 
with heavy caseloads, would be reluctant to spend hours or days reading the necessary 
materials. Obtaining a sufficient sample size necessitated abridged materials.  
Finally, judges’ knowledge that they were only responding to a hypothetical case 
and not making a determination about a real defendant may have, in some way, affected 
judges’ decision-making.  However, the judges did take the time to respond to the survey 
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and appeared to give it careful consideration, suggesting that such an effect may not be a 
major concern.   
Despite these potential limitations, the current study provided important 
information that could contribute to our understanding of judges’ decision making in 
juvenile cases.  Specifically, it revealed that holding a juvenile for a long period of time 
pre-trial may not impact their trial outcomes, as measured by judges’ ratings of likelihood 
of recidivism, dangerousness, sentence length, and verdict.  Therefore, in spite of 
pronounced developmental changes occurring during adolescence, holding juveniles for 
extended periods of time may not affect their trial outcomes.  It also demonstrated that 
the extralegal factor of gender may not affect judicial decisions.  
Another concern that might be raised is the possible overlap in judges’ minds 
between the terms “dangerousness” and “recidivism,” as used in the questionnaire.  It is 
possible that judges, in considering these questions, may have had varying definitions in 
mind.  As used in the questionnaire, these terms were intended to represent different 
constructs.  Dangerousness was intended to refer to the defendant’s propensity for 
violence in the future, while recidivism was meant to address the juvenile’s likelihood of 
committing additional offenses, whether violent or not.  Although these terms were not 
defined for judges within the questionnaire, these constructs are often considered 
separately in state statutes, (see e.g., ORS 419C.349, 42 Pa. C. S. Sec. 6355); thus, as 
intended, judges may have considered dangerousness and recidivism to be different, non-
overlapping constructs. 
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CHAPTER 8:  IMPLICATIONS  
 The current study did not find any gender disparities in measures of trial outcome.  
Provided this is an accurate finding, these results shed some light on our legal system.  
First, these findings suggest that gender disparities in our judicial system may have 
equalized since the cited studies (e.g. Chesney-Lind, 1997; Nagel & Weitzman 1971) that 
were conducted between the 1960s and 1990s.  As noted earlier, this may be due, in part, 
to changing conceptions of traditional sex roles and stereotypes.  Another possible 
explanation would be that, despite the Supreme Court’s finding that the Guidelines are 
only advisory and no longer mandatory, courts are continuing to follow them, thereby, 
having the desired effect of decreasing disparity in sentencing.  However, as discussed 
below, more research is needed to investigate possible interactions between gender and 
other important variables. 
 With regard to the defendant’s age, the current research calls into question 
whether the relationship between age and trial outcomes consistently holds in the 
direction observed in past research.  In previous research (e.g., Warling, 2001), youth 
acted as a mitigator.  However, the current study found that younger juveniles received 
harsher sentences than their adult counterparts.  This suggests that a third intervening 
variable may moderate the relationship between age and measures of trial outcome.  
Future research is needed to clarify this discrepancy, and identification of such a variable 
could have implications for adjudication. 
If the observed effect of age on trial outcomes is accurate, such a finding may 
have implications for any of the numerous reasons why a juvenile may experience a delay 
between the commission of the alleged offense and adjudication (e.g., delays due to 
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competence to stand trial evaluation and restoration, change of attorney, motions for 
change of venue, scheduling delays, a defendant jumping bail or eluding arrest).  
Specifically, this study suggests that it may be to juvenile’s advantage to delay his or her 
trial.  However, as noted above, some third variable omitted from the study may account 
for the results. Alternatively, the fact that the juvenile in the vignette had not been 
arrested for any major offenses in the intervening period may have played a role in 
judges’ decision making. 
Because the paucity of studies in this area prohibits examining the consistency of 
results with previous research, the validity of our results should be questioned.  Further, 
because it is not yet possible to determine whether this extralegal variable does influence 
judicial decision making, it is important to consider the implications if younger age does 
act as a mitigator in trial outcomes, as previous research suggested (Warling, 2001; 
Warling & Peterson Badali, 2003).  If it is found that younger defendants receive less 
harsh punishments, the implications would be quite different.  For example, relevant 
procedures might need to be adjusted to account for the rapid development of juveniles 
during periods of trial delays and the potential impact of their development on 
factfinders’ impressions and decision making. Furthermore, such adjustments might be 
needed to ensure youths’ cases reach trial faster, thereby, increasing fairness to the 
juvenile defendants. Attorneys might realize that it is in their juvenile clients’ best 
interest to get trials to court quickly. Finally, if attorneys and other legal personnel are 
aware of the ways in which judges may be biased against older juveniles, they could try 
to guard against the effects of these biases through defense attorney warnings, for 
example.  
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If the current study’s findings are confirmed by future research, and older age acts 
as a mitigator, one way to guard against the extralegal effect of youth would be to call 
judges’ attention to possible biases and use of stereotypes that might affect their 
judgments. In fact, the social cognition literature reveals that when individuals’ attention 
is called to their tendencies to stereotype, in some situations, people are able to counteract 
this tendency. (Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 1998). This could be accomplished 
through statements by defense attorneys or through the use of expert testimony, 
regardless of whether the fact finder is a judge or a jury.  
 
Implications for Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial of Biases in Trial Outcomes  
 
It is important to continue clarifying the relationship between age and trial 
outcomes.  If future research were to support our finding that older age is a mitigator of 
trial outcome, then juveniles would benefit from delaying their trials until they were 
older.  Therefore, attorneys might actually wish to delay their clients’ hearings whenever 
ethically possible.  In contrast, if future studies were to support previous findings that 
young age is a mitigator of sentence length, one particularly salient application of this 
research would be to pretrial detention of juveniles for competence restoration. One of 
the fundamental rights within our criminal justice system is a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial (e.g., United States Constitution, Amendments 5, 6, 14).  Integral to this right is the 
mandate that, in order for a defendant’s trial to be fair, he or she must, not only be 
physically present, but be mentally present as well (American Jurisprudence, 2004). To 
guarantee this right, the Supreme Court, in Dusky v. United States (1960) and Drope v. 
Missouri (1975), established standards requiring defendants to be competent to stand 
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trial. Under this Dusky / Drope standard, in order for a defendant to be considered 
competent, he or she must not only have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or her, but also be able to assist the attorney in his or her defense 
(Dusky, 1960; Drope, 1975). Although the Supreme Court has only clearly enunciated 
that this standard applies to adults, many jurisdictions consider it applicable to juveniles 
as well (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Dusky, 1960; Drope, 1975). If the defendant is found 
competent under the Dusky standard, the court will allow the trial to proceed (Redding & 
Frost, 2001). However, if the defendant is found to be incompetent, he or she is typically 
transferred to a secure facility for competence restoration (Redding & Frost). Later, if 
competence is restored through treatment, the defendant’s trial resumes (Melton et al., 
1997).  
Although the Supreme Court laid out the standard and process for competence 
determinations in Dusky and its progeny (e.g., Dusky, 1960), it was not until 1972 that 
the Court discussed the maximum length of time a defendant could be held for 
competence restoration (Jackson, 1972). In Jackson v. Indiana, the Court ruled that 
defendants who are transferred for competence restoration may only be held for a 
“reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is any substantial 
probability that he will attain [competence] in the foreseeable future” (Jackson, 1972, p. 
738). As a result of the Supreme Court’s lack of specificity regarding the definition of a 
“reasonable length of time,” states have taken a variety of approaches to fulfilling 
Jackson’s mandates (Redding & Frost, 2001). States have implemented this standard in a 
variety of ways that range from a defendant being held pretrial for anywhere from 6 
months (e.g., South Carolina) to the length of time that they would have been held if 
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found guilty (e.g., Louisiana).  
Consideration of the effects of competence restoration on juveniles has become 
increasingly important in recent years.  Although, in the past, juvenile cases were 
assumed to be heard under more rehabilitative ideals within the juvenile system (Mack, 
1909), in recent years, both the juvenile and adult systems have become increasingly 
punitive (Grisso, 1997). In addition to a general shift in public opinion toward more 
retributive ideals for criminal sanctions, transfer or waiver laws have been relaxed in 
many states, resulting in more juveniles being moved to the adult criminal system for trial 
(Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000). In other words, in the past, juvenile cases were heard in 
the more rehabilitation-oriented juvenile courts, but today, they are increasingly likely to 
be transferred to the more punitive adult criminal system.  Also, younger aged defendants 
are being transferred with greater frequency (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000) and transfer 
occurs for a wider range of offenses (Torbet, 1996; Campaign for an Effective Crime 
Policy, 1996).  
As a result of these statutory changes, the issue of juvenile competence is now 
increasingly raised, and more juveniles are sent for competence restoration. Additionally, 
the issue of competence restoration may be even more important for juveniles than for 
adults due to evidence that restoration periods for adolescents may be longer than those 
for adults (McGaha, Otto, McClaren, & Petrila, 2001; Pinals, 2005). Specifically, 
research has found that there is a larger proportion of mental retardation found among 
incompetent juveniles than among incompetent adults (McGaha, Otto, McClaren, & 
Petrila, 2001) and that mentally retarded individuals have longer restoration periods 
(Pinals, 2005). Studies have demonstrated that the inclusion of larger proportions of 
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mentally retarded individuals may make restoration periods even longer than the average 
of two to three months cited by some authors (McGaha, et al., 2001; Simon, 1999; Hoge, 
et al. 1996 ). Thus, understanding the possible effects of longer competence restoration 
periods on the adjudication of juveniles seems particularly relevant to determinations of 
equal treatment in the criminal justice system.  
If juveniles are treated differently based on the extralegal factor of age, juveniles’ 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial would be in question (In re Gault, 1967). 
Consequently, it is possible that the justice system would need to consider ways to 
counteract these effects. Possibly, juveniles would need their own substantive standards, 
rather than simply incorporating the adult statutes created to meet the Jackson (1972) 
requirements. Perhaps, these juvenile-specific standards would permit only shorter 
restoration periods before the juvenile would need to be released, along with more 
frequent review periods to ensure that the restoration process is truly making progress.  
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CHAPTER 9:  FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH 
Future research could build upon the current study in several ways.  First, the use 
of longer vignettes that incorporate more material upon which to make a decision would 
better approximate a real case, thereby, making the results more ecologically valid.  As 
discussed several judges in this study declined to answer some items based upon the 
rationale that not enough information was provided.  While the cautionary discussion 
regarding the likelihood of judges taking the time to complete a lengthy study still 
applies, it is possible, based upon the comments of responding judges that some may 
have been willing to consider additional information, if provided.  The current vignette 
was confined to one page; however, future studies might expand upon this vignette in 
order to provide additional information.   
Visual cues could also be incorporated into the study.  As discussed above, it may 
be these visual cues, rather than age itself that would better account for the effects of age 
on trial outcomes.  However, holding constant other visual variables while changing the 
age of the individual may only be accomplished using technology, such as morphing, 
which is very expensive. Funded research would benefit from the inclusion of these 
visual cues. 
Another important, future investigation would be to compare judges’ and jurors’ 
decision making.  If such differences exist, this comparison could be vitally important to 
defendants determining whether, and under what conditions, they should exercise their 6th 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  Such findings could also have implications for the 
fairness of our trial system.   
Future lines of research might also examine whether disparities exist at other 
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stages of the legal process.  Perhaps women benefit from their gender more informally, 
through police or prosecutor diversion.  Future studies might apply similar survey 
methods to other actors within the legal process to determine whether diversion decisions 
differ based upon gender, as other studies have found with race (Jones & Kaplan, 2003).   
Finally, interactions of age and gender with other important variables should be 
incorporated into future studies.  Such variables might include SES, intelligence, mental 
health diagnosis, or type of crime committed. It is also important to note that, because 
these variables were held constant in the current study, results may not be generalizable 
to defendants who do not belong to the groups identified within the vignette.  For 
example, the defendant in the case vignette was described as African American; 
therefore, the results of the current study may not be applicable to defendants of other 
races. 
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APPENDIX A:  Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1.  
 
Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Appropriate Sentence Length for Juvenile Defendant 
by Judges’ Demographic Characteristics 
 
 
 
Source Df F Partial Eta2 p 
 
Judge’s Age 
 
3 
 
1.960 
 
.002 
 
.971 
 
Judge’s Gender 
 
1 
 
36.175 
 
.011 
 
.227 
 
Judge’s Race 
 
3 
 
8.253 
 
.007 
 
.800 
 
Marital Status 
 
3 
 
41.586 
 
.036 
 
.172 
 
Area of Residence 
 
2 
 
16.913 
 
.010 
 
.504 
 
Political View 
 
5 
 
13.730 
 
.020 
 
.732 
 
Annual Income 
 
1 
 
7.074 
 
.002 
 
.593 
 
S Within group 
error 137 (24.593) 
  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.  
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Table 2.  
 
Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Responsibility of Juvenile Defendants by Judges’ 
Demographic Characteristics 
 
 
 
Source Df F Partial Eta2 p 
 
 
Judge’s Age 
 
3 
 
1.177 
 
.019 
 
.320 
 
Judge’s Gender 
 
1 
 
.642 
 
.003 
 
.424 
 
Judge’s Race 
 
5 
 
.606 
 
.016 
 
.695 
 
Marital Status 
 
3 
 
.143 
 
.002 
 
.934 
 
Area of Residence 
 
2 
 
.107 
 
.001 
 
.898 
 
Political View 
 
5 
 
.813 
 
.022 
 
.542 
 
Annual Income 
 
1 
 
1.398 
 
.007 
 
.239 
 
S Within group 
error 185 (2.503) 
  
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.   
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Table 3. 
Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Dangerousness of Juvenile Defendants by Judges’ 
Demographic Characteristics 
 
 
 
Source df F Partial Eta2 p 
 
Judge’s Age 
 
3 
 
.740 
 
.012 
 
.530 
 
Judge’s Gender 
 
1 
 
.040 
 
.000 
 
.841 
 
Judge’s Race 
 
5 
 
1.132 
 
.030 
 
.345 
 
Marital Status 
 
3 
 
.347 
 
.006 
 
.791 
 
Area of Residence 
 
2 
 
.035 
 
.000 
 
.966 
 
Political View 
 
5 
 
.803 
 
.021 
 
.549 
 
Annual Income 
 
1 
 
1.244 
 
.007 
 
.266 
 
S Within group 
error 183 1.426 
  
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.    
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Table 4. 
 
Differences in Judges’ Ratings of Likelihood of Recidivism of Juvenile Defendants by 
Judges’ Demographic Characteristics 
 
 
 
Source Df F Partial Eta2 p 
 
Judge’s Age 
 
3 
 
1.250 
 
.020 
 
.293 
 
Judge’s Gender 
 
1 
 
.677 
 
.004 
 
.412 
 
Judge’s Race 
 
5 
 
.677 
 
.018 
 
.642 
 
Marital Status 
 
3 
 
.397 
 
.007 
 
.755 
 
Area of Residence 
 
2 
 
.525 
 
.006 
 
.592 
 
Political View 
 
5 
 
1.077 
 
.029 
 
.375 
 
Annual Income 
 
1 
 
1.264 
 
.007 
 
.262 
 
S Within group 
error 180 (2.393) 
  
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.   
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Table 5.  
Intercorrelations Between Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 Dangerousness Recidivism Sentence 
Responsibility .692* .600* .344* 
Dangerousness  .701* .396* 
Recidivism   .265* 
*  p < 0.01  
 
 
 
Table 6.   
Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ Ratings of 
Appropriate Sentence Length for Juvenile Defendants 
 
 
 
Source df F Partial Eta2 p 
Age (A) 
 
3 
 
1.571 
 
.029 
 
.199 
 
Gender (G) 
 
1 
 
.000 
 
.000 
 
.984 
 
A X G 
 
3 
 
.494 
 
.009 
 
.687 
 
S Within group 
error 159 (25.093) 
  
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.   
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Table 7.  
Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ Ratings of 
Juvenile Defendants’ Responsibility 
 
 
 
Source df F Partial Eta2 P 
Age (A) 
 
3 
 
1.994 
 
.027 
 
.116 
 
Gender (G) 
 
1 
 
.042 
 
.000 
 
.838 
 
A X G 
 
3 
 
1.449 
 
.020 
 
.230 
 
S Within group 
error 212  
  
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.   
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Table 8.  
Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ Ratings of 
Juvenile Defendants’ Dangerousness 
 
 
Source df F Partial Eta2 p 
Age (A) 
 
3 
 
2.956* 
 
.041 
 
.033 
 
Gender (G) 
 
1 
 
.432 
 
.002 
 
.512 
 
A X G 
 
3 
 
.293 
 
.004 
 
.830 
 
S Within group 
error 210 (1.421)   
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects. 
*p < .05   
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Table 9.  
Effect of Age, Gender, and Interaction Between Age and Gender on Judges’ Ratings of 
Juvenile Defendants’ Likelihood of Recidivism 
 
 
Source df F Partial Eta2 p 
Age (A) 
 
3 
 
6.285* 
 
.084 
 
.000 
 
Gender (G) 
 
1 
 
1.568 
 
.008 
 
.212 
 
A X G 
 
3 
 
1.187 
 
.017 
 
.316 
 
S Within group 
error 205 (2.145)   
Note.  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared errors.  S = subjects.  
*p <.01  
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Table 10.   
Planned Contrasts Between Age Groups on Dangerousness and Recidivism 
 
 
 
 Contrast t Df p 
Dangerousness 13 / 15 .028 83.483 .978 
 15 / 17 1.738 81.996 .086 
 17 / 24 .988 124.821 .325 
Recidivism 13 / 15 -.153 73.154 .878 
 15 / 17 1.319 70.986 .191 
 17 / 24 2.730* 125.136 .007 
*  p < .01 
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APPENDIX B:  Figures 
 
Figure 1. Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Responsibility 
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Note.  Mean = 2.83, St. Dev. = 1.60, Skewness = .50, Kurtosis = -.80. 
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Figure 2.  Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Dangerousness 
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Note. Mean = 2.53, St. Dev. = 1.21, Skewness = .39, Kurtosis = -.50. 
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Figure 3.  Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Sentence Length 
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Note. Mean = 1.28, St. Dev. = .56, Skewness = 1.87, Kurtosis = 2.50. 
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Figure 4. Normality of Judges’ Ratings of Recidivism 
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Note. Mean = 3.53, St. Dev. = 1.50, Skewness = -.04, Kurtosis = -.93. 
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APPENDIX C: Letter Introducing Study, Consent, and Instructions  
 
 
 
The current study is being conducted as part of the JD-PhD program in law and 
psychology at Villanova University School of Law and Drexel University. We are 
conducting research on judges/ jurors decision-making and would very much appreciate 
your participation. The enclosed survey is very brief requiring only 10-15 minutes to 
complete and is anonymous so you will not be asked to provide any identifying 
information. Your participation is completely voluntary. By completing the survey and 
returning it in the envelope provided, you are considered to have provided your consent 
to participate in the study.  
 
If you would like to participate, please read the following short trail vignette and answer 
the questions in the brief questionnaire that follows. The vignette provides a hypothetical 
opening statement for both a defense attorney and a prosecutor. The brief questionnaire 
following it will ask you to answer questions based upon the vignette followed by a 
demographics questionnaire. Please answer all items in the order that they are presented 
and do not skip ahead. Also, please do not return to previously answered questions to 
change your response once you have read the additional sections. Further, please attempt 
to answer all of the questions contain in the questionnaire. If you experience any irritation 
and discomfort in answering any question, please skip that question.  
 
After you have completed the survey, please place it back into the envelope that has been 
provided and return it. Thank you in advance for your participation in this study. Your 
participation is greatly appreciated and will provide valuable information about the 
judicial process.  
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APPENDIX D: Follow-up Letter Introducing Study, Consent, and Instructions  
 
 
 
The current study is being conducted as part of the JD-PhD program in law and 
psychology at Villanova University School of Law and Drexel University. This packet is 
being sent as a follow-up to one sent two weeks ago, however, due to the anonymity 
of the research study it is not possible for the researchers to determine whether you 
have already completed the previous packet. If you already completed the previous 
survey, thank you for your participation, please discard this survey. If you have not 
completed the previous survey, we hope that you will consider completing the 
survey below.  
 
If you have not completed the previous survey, we are conducting research on judges/ 
jurors decision-making and would very much appreciate your participation. The enclosed 
survey is very brief requiring only 10-15 minutes to complete and is anonymous so you 
will not be asked to provide any identifying information. Your participation is completely 
voluntary. By completing the survey and returning it in the envelope provided, you are 
considered to have provided your consent to participate in the study.  
 
If you would like to participate, please read the following short trail vignette and answer 
the questions in the brief questionnaire that follows. The vignette provides a hypothetical 
opening statement for both a defense attorney and a prosecutor. The brief questionnaire 
following it will ask you to answer questions based upon the vignette followed by a 
demographics questionnaire. Please answer all items in the order that they are presented 
and do not skip ahead. Also, please do not return to previously answered questions to 
change your response once you have read the additional sections. Further, please attempt 
to answer all of the questions contain in the questionnaire. If you experience any irritation 
and discomfort in answering any question, please skip that question.  
 
After you have completed the survey, please place it back into the envelope that has been 
provided and return it. Thank you in advance for your participation in this study. Your 
participation is greatly appreciated and will provide valuable information about the 
judicial process.  
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APPENDIX E: Trial Vignette  
 
 
The following is a hypothetical case summary. Please read the summary and then 
complete the questions that follow. Please do not read ahead. Following the case 
summary, answer each question in the order that it is presented.  
 
Case Summary  
 
The defendant, [John/Joan], is a [13,15,17,24] year old [male / female] who has 
been charged with assault and possession of an instrument of crime. The defendant was 
13 years old when he / she committed the alleged crime. The defendant was arrested 
approximately five hours after the alleged offenses, a pre-adjudication hearing was held 
the following day, and the youth was released on bail. The defendant jumped bail and 
was not found until [10 months, 2 years 10 months, 4 years 10 months, 6 years 10 
months] later when he/she was arrested on charges of underage drinking and disturbing 
the peace.  
An investigation concerning the original offense was conducted immediately 
following its occurrence. The investigation resulted in a number of findings. First, 
approximately half an hour prior to the crime, the defendant was seen in the area by an 
eyewitness who was a neighbor who knew [John/Joan] well. Second, around the time of 
the alleged offense, another nearby witness heard a noise that aroused suspicion. The 
witness described a person similar to [John/Joan’s] description. Specifically, the witness 
stated that the perpetrator was an African American male / female who was about 13 
years old wearing loose fitting blue jeans, a red t-shirt shirt, and a black baseball cap with 
a white logo on the front. The defendant was apprehended and arrested for the alleged 
   89
crime. The defendant was allowed out on bail, jumped bail and was not rearrested until 
[10 months, 2 years 10 months, 4 years 10 months, 6 years 10 months] later.  
The defendant is now [13, 15, 17, 24] years old. He / She is an African American 
male / female with an IQ of 80, which is about average for juveniles involved in the 
justice system, but falls at the bottom of the Low Average range of IQ for people in the 
general population. In other words, compared with the general population, roughly 11% 
of people scored lower than the defendant and about 89% of people scored higher than 
the defendant on standard IQ measures. At the time that [John / Joan] allegedly 
committed the crime he / she was roughly [males = 127 lbs. and 5’3” inches tall; females 
= 118 lbs. and 5’3 inches tall]” with short brown hair and eyes and a scar on his / her 
right arm.  
The defendant has now come to his/her hearing. It is [X = 10, 22, 34, 46] months later 
and he/she is 2 months short of his/her [14th, 16th, 18th, 25th] birthday. [John/Joan] is 
now [average height and weight for age (female) = 5’3” and 132 lbs.; 5’4” and 139 lbs., 
5’4” and 143 lbs., 5’4” and 157lbs.; average height and weight for age (male) = 5’5” and 
131 lbs., 5’8” and 157 lbs., 5’9” and 172 lbs., 5’9” and 189 lbs.] and appears his / her 
stated age. He / She has been diagnosed with Major Depression and is considered to be of 
lower-middle socioeconomic (SES) status. Prior to his / her arrest, the defendant 
completed the 8th grade and did odd jobs for neighbors, such as mowing lawns, 
shoveling snow, and washing cars.  
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APPENDIX F: Brief Questionnaire Regarding Trial Vignette  
 
 
Instructions: Please answer the questions below where indicated. Your answers are 
completely anonymous. There is no way that we can link your response to you, however, 
if you feel uncomfortable about providing any information, please leave that question 
blank.  
 
1. Based on the circumstances described above, do you believe the [13, 15, 17, 24] -year-
old male / female should be found guilty of the crime?  
_____ Guilty _____ Not Guilty  
 
2. Based on the circumstances described above how long of a sentence do you believe 
this [13, 15, 17, 24] -year-old male / female should receive (the Sentencing Guidelines 
used to make similar decisions suggest a range of 15 – 21 for those who commit assault 
with a weapon)?  
_____ Below 15 ______Above 21  
_____Between 15 and 21  
 
3.  If Between 15-21 (please specify number of years)____________  
 
 
4. How responsible do you think this [13, 15, 17, 24] -year-old male / female was for the 
crime?  
 
1    2   3   4   5   6  
 
Not          Extremely  
Responsible         Responsible  
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5. How dangerous is this [13, 15, 17, 24] -year old male / female?  
1    2   3   4   5   6  
Not Dangerous       Extremely Dangerous  
 
6. How likely is this juvenile to commit additional crimes in the future?  
1    2   3   4  5   6  
Unlikely         Extremely Likely  
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APPENDIX G: Demographic Survey  
 
 
Instructions: Please answer the questions below where indicated. Your answers are 
completely anonymous. There is no way that we can link your response to you, however, 
if you feel uncomfortable about providing any information, please leave that question 
blank.  
 
 
1. Your Age:  
 
___ 21 and under      ___ 26 – 30                      ____ 41 – 50                        _____65+  
___ 22 - 25                ___ 31 – 40                     ____ 51 – 65  
 
2. Your Gender: ___ male ___ female  
 
3. Your Race/Ethnicity:  
___ African American (non-Hispanic)                ___ American Indian or Alaskan 
Native 
 ___ Asian             ___ Hispanic or Latino                ___White (not Hispanic)                                      
___ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander         ___ Other (please specify) 
_________ 
 
4. Your Annual Income:  
___ $24,999 and under ___ $75,000 - $99,999  
___ $25,000 - $49,999 ___ $100,000 and above  
___ $50,000 - $74,999  
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5. Your Marital Status:  
___ Single ___ Separated or Divorced  
___ Married ___ Widowed  
 
6. Area of Residence (please circle only one):  
Urban   Suburban   Rural  
_____  _____   _______ 
 
7. On average, how often do you interact with individuals aged 13 to 19?  
____ almost never  
____ about twice a year  
____ once every few months  
____ once a month  
____ once a week  
____ every day  
 
8.  Have you heard a case in which a juvenile has committed a crime with the past year? 
______   Yes    _______ No 
 
9.  In what type of court do you preside? 
Criminal Court   Juvenile Court 
 
Other (Please specify)____________________________ 
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10.  Please rate your political views: 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
    Very Liberal         Moderate          Very Conservative 
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